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How is "Success" Defined?:
An Involuntary Resettlement Case Under Japan's Development Assistance Project
By Hiroko Tanaka
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the impact of popular oppositions to the formulation and
implementation of an involuntary resettlement program created by a Japanese funded
dam project. The focus of the analysis is on the Japanese aid agency's policy toward the
resettlers' participation in the resettlement. In this study of a resettlement program for
the villages displaced by the Kotapanjang Hydroelectric Power Project in Sumatra,
Indonesia, I found that:
1. The opposition movements had some positive impact on the implementation
of the resettlement program by forcing the Japanese government to take special
measures to improve the resettlement policy. The direct involvement of Japan in the
resettlement case helped the project in: 1) giving the legitimacy to the resettlers'
demands; 2) motivating the Indonesian implementation agency to play a major role in
the resettlement program; 3) applying a higher standard for the resettlement package in
comparison to past cases in Indonesia; and 4) incorporating the resettlers' demands in
some important elements of the resettlement program.
2. Although the physical improvement of the resettlement project was an
important achievement, the project suffered due to several failures of the project
implementers. The project suffered from: 1) lack of concern over the process of
negotiating and implementing resettlement; 2) lack of recognition of the different
perceptions of the standard of "fairness" of the compensation rates between the
government of Indonesia and the resettlers; 3) failure to recognize the different
perceptions across the affected villages that resulted from differential impacts of the
program; and 4) lack of commitment to the resettlers' participation. For these reasons,
conflicts with the project opponents continued despite the considerable improvements
over earlier resettlement program.
Based on the case analysis, the thesis presents policy recommendations to the
Japanese aid agencies regarding the need to: 1) clearly recognize the donor
responsibility in involuntary resettlement; 2) place more emphasis on the preparation of
resettlement projects; 3) allocate staff specializing in resettlement and social policies to
each operational division; 4) take clear steps to ensure the resettlers' participation; and
5) learn lessons from the mistakes of resettlement policies in Japan.
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Title: Assistant Professor of Political Economy and Planning
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Chapter I. Introduction
Only a few decades ago Japan was a major borrower from the Multilateral
Development Bank, as it tried to rebuild the nation following post World War II
disaster and chaos. Following its rapid economic growth, Japan has emerged as
a leading provider of development assistance since the late 1970s. In 1989, Japan
surpassed the US as number one aid provider, and it maintained the top position
in 1991 and 19921. However, in contrast to the internationally-admired "success"
in Japan's own domestic economic development, many of its Official
Development Assistance (ODA)2 projects in developing countries face severe
criticisms as "failures" by NGOs, citizen groups and the media. This "ODA
controversy" has flourished in Japan since the mid-1980s and, as a result, the
public image of ODA in Japan is quite negative. The ODA seems to be more
associated with political scandals, corruption and greed of the business sector
than with the government of Japan (GOJ) vision of it as the Japan's major
contribution to the international community.
The core of the controversy is that Japan's ODA is too centered on mega
infrastructure projects, which not only fail to benefit the residents of the project
area but also, more often than not, actually harm their livelihoods. The
compulsory displacement of people often induced by dams and reservoir
projects is a common and the most visible example. Rough estimates suggest
that "each year between 1.2 million and 2.1 million people are displaced world
1Calculated in US dollar terms, net disbursement.2Defined by OECD/DAC (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development/
Development Assistance Committee) as flow of public funds to promote the economic
development and welfare of the recipient country. The aid must convey a grant element of at
least 25%, which is an index of concessionality calculated by the DAC. ODA may be provided in
the form of grant assistance, technical cooperation, governmental loans or contributions to United
Nations agencies and multilateral development banks. The grant element for Japan's total ODA
in 1990 was 77%, considerably below the DAC member country average of 93%. A greater
portion of Japan's ODA is in the form of soft loans than grants.
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wide as a consequence of new dam construction alone" (Cernea, 1990). Japan, as
one of a few international donors active in financing large scale infrastructure
projects, has certainly "contributed" to this situation in a major way.
Despite the widely recognized problems associated with involuntary
resettlement, however, GOJ has long been reluctant to tackle the issue directly.
The major reason for this is GOJ's principle of "non-intervention" in the domestic
issues of recipient countries. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, pressures from
active anti-dam campaigns run by ODA opponents, as well as from the
international environmental NGO alliance, forced GOJ to recognize the obvious
"failure" of two dam projects in India and in Indonesia 3. The Kotapanjang dam
in Sumatra, Indonesia, on which I focus my analysis in this study, was appraised
for the provision of an ODA loan after these bitter experiences. The Japanese
NGO community reacted immediately against the construction plan, forming an
alliance with Indonesian national and local environmental NGOs. GOJ, having
supposedly learned a hard lesson from the previous two projects, decided to
directly involve itself in the resettlement issue in the case of Kotapanjang, for the
first time in the history of its ODA program. As of the summer 1993, when
resettlement of several villages had been completed, all of the officials concerned
with the project both in Japan and in Indonesia expressed satisfaction with the
ways that the resettlement program had proceeded. Some said that the
Kotapanjang case would serve as the "successful" model of development-project-
induced resettlement. However, I observe a shadow over this alleged success in
the continuing resistance of the NGO community and the remaining
dissatisfaction in some of the resettling villages.
3Some details of these projects are discussed in Chapter III.
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1.1. Objectives of the Thesis
The objectives of this thesis are: one, to analyze the resettlement process
used during the Kotapanjang hydroelectric power generation project, which was
funded under Japan's ODA program; and two, based on the analysis, to present
policy recommendations for the Japanese aid agencies in order to improve future
resettlement cases. This thesis is primarily intended for the Development
Assistance policy-makers, project officers and other development practitioners of
Japan. I also hope my thesis will be of interest to individuals concerned with
involuntary resettlement created by development projects, particularly staff of
environmental NGOs. Finally, I would like to share my study with those who
are concerned with the problematic elements of economic development
interventions--particularly the tension between the rights of individuals and
communities versus the broader public interest in economic development.
1.2. Analysis of the problems of involuntary resettlement
What exactly are the problems associated with involuntary resettlement?
Although common sense gives us a general idea of the hardships that result from
forced resettlement, it is important to clearly recognize the specific nature of
problems in order to develop appropriate policy measures to tackle these issues.
The problems of involuntary resettlement can be divided into two categories: the
first includes the problems inherent in the nature of the involuntary resettlement;
and the second includes the problems associated with management of
resettlement operations.
Inherent Problems of Involuntary Resettlement
The literature highlights three kinds of stress that result from involuntary
resettlement: physiological, psychological and sociocultural stresses (Scudder
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and Colson, 1982). Physiological stress is greatest among the elderly. Although
statistical data are not available to show increased mortality and morbidity as a
result of resettlement, resettlement experts as well as some medical personnel
share the view that "elderly in particular are apt to die 'of a broken heart'
following removal" (Scudder and Colson, 1982). Physiological stress is also
profoundly associated with psychological stress. Adverse health effects also
often result from poor hygiene and inadequate water and waste disposal systems
of the newly prepared villages for resettlement (Cernea, 1990).
Psychological stress refers to "the grieving for a lost home" syndrome
(Fried, 1963, quoted by Scudder and Colson, 1982) and anxiety about an
uncertain future. "Home" refers to a broad concept which includes various
aspects of familiar environment: community and surrounding landscape, as well
as historical and religious symbolism. This type of stress increases when the
resettlers need to move long distances and have to deal with unfamiliar host
populations.
The uncertainty about the future is another source of psychological stress
prior to resettlement. Particularly in the cases of large-scale dam and highway
construction, the resettlers often live with great uncertainty for an extended
period of time after the first rumors arise concerning the possible relocation.
People often cope with this uncertainty by adopting a "business as usual--it can't
happen to us" strategy (Scudder and Colson, 1982). Studies show, for example,
that people continue to build houses until the removal of the community. The
uncertainty is so stressful that people consciously and subconsciously try to deal
with it by not directly facing the reality.
Sociocultural stress refers to negative impacts of resettlement on the
community as a whole, which may be divided into economic and non-economic
components. The economic "impoverishment effects" of involuntary resettlement
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are the most serious, resulting from landlessness, joblessness, homelessness,
marginalization 4 and food insecurity (Cernea, 1990). Temporary deterioration of
economic status is almost inevitable even for the voluntary resettlers, largely due
to such reasons as insufficient preparation of land and infrastructure. Moreover,
many resettlers never regain their previous standard of living. Economic stress
is greater for the poor and the landless when the compensation does not cover
the replacement cost of land and housing. Non-economic social stress results
from such disruptive factors of community structure as loss of leadership,
unsimilar environment and co-existence with a new host population.
Common Management Problems of Involuntary Resettlement
Insufficient attention to and mishandling of involuntary resettlement have
aggravated the inherent problems in many past projects. The literature suggests
at least two reasons why the process of resettlement has been systematically
neglected: the existence of a "policy vacuum" and the technical bias of many
development agencies (Cernea, 1990; Guggenheim, 1993).
In most countries, the issue of resettlement exists in a policy vacuum.
Many countries lack policies to deal with resettlement concerns, which
compounds the inherent adverse impact of resettlement with inappropriate
practices, such as ad-hoc treatment of the problem, insufficient resource
allocation, under-planning and poor execution (Cernea, 1990). The state is
usually equipped with a legal right to expropriate land for public purposes, a
right also recognized by international law. However, there are many cases where
laws only recognize the right of the state to take lands away without specifying a
legal mechanism for restoring them for those who have to give them up
4 By marginalization, Cernea refers to the relative deterioration of social and economic status of
each individual in comparison to the way things were prior to resettlement.
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(Guggenheim, 1993). In other words, laws specify the right of the state and fail to
acknowledge the accompanying obligation. Moreover, the problem is often not
only the lack of legal mechanisms, but also the existence of regulations which
prevent the restoration of lands and other assets to resettlers. For example, "most
countries' laws do not allow public companies to compensate private individuals
at more than assessed values," although assessed values are almost always lower
than the actual replacement cost of the lands (Guggenheim, 1993). Ironically, the
problem of policy vacuum for resettlement operations is even more serious
because the situation is coupled with a stringent, legalistic handling of the issue.
Another reason for the systematic neglect of resettlement management
derives from organizational aspects of the responsible agencies. The so called
'engineering or technical bias' prevails in most of project implementation
agencies, such as power companies and civil engineering corporations. This bias
limits the range of variables taken into consideration in the project planning
process. Even when social issues gain some attention, they are treated at the
bottom of the hierarchy of the organizational structure and are given a low
priority. Inadequate planning and insufficient allocation of financial and staff
resources result from the organizational structure that typically assigns the task
to low-level bureaucracy rather than senior managerial level (Cernea, 1990;
Guggenheim, 1993). Resettlement is a complex operation that requires authority
and institutional strength (V.Q. Adu-Aryee, 1993). Many find that cost benefit
analyses of projects consider only direct costs of construction and do not take
into account indirect social and environmental costs (e.g. Fernandes Serra, 1993).
The engineering or technical bias is not limited to executing companies.
The international funding agencies are still largely dominated by a technocratic
or "econocratic" culture, in which consideration of the sociocultural dimension of
development projects is only gradually being institutionalized (e.g. Guidelines
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for Social Analysis of Development Projects: Asian Development Bank, 1991).
Nevertheless, even when costs of involuntary resettlement are not explicitly
calculated in the rate of return of the project, this does not imply that costs
disappear. Rather, they are shifted to the resettlers. In effect resettlers are
unreasonably forced to subsidize the project (Partridge, Cernea, Guggenheim,
1993).
1.3. Japan's development assistance to Indonesia
Indonesia is the largest recipient country of Japan's development
assistance. From the point of view of the government of Indonesia (GOI), Japan
is the largest donor country. A major portion of the bilateral assistance provided
to Indonesia is in the form of concessionary loans administered by one of the two
aid agencies of Japan, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF)5. Soft
loans under OECF's lending program to Indonesia started in 1968, and the
cumulative amount of lending to Indonesia as of the end of March, 1993,479
loans amounting to 222.4 billion yen (US $202 million), comprised about 20% of
the total OECF lending. Indonesia is one of the twelve original countries
targeted by the ODA program in the 1950s, as part of Japan's war reparation
efforts. In addition, an obvious reason for the importance of diplomatic relations
with Indonesia from GOJ's point of view lies in the abundant natural resource
base that Indonesia possesses. "Mutual dependence" is one of the officially stated
5 Japan's bilateral aid consists of three categories: 1) grants, such as food aid, provisions of
buildings, equipment and "package of services" (e.g., hospitals, medical equipment and technical
experts) and requiring no repayment; 2) technical assistance, often provided in-kind and
requiring no repayment; and 3) concessionary loans, which require repayment at a lower-than-
commercial rate. 1) and 2) are administered by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
and 3), by OECF. Feasibility studies are called "development studies" in JICA's terminology and
comprise an important part of the technical assistance component of Japan's ODA. Only a small
portion (less than 30%) of the feasibility studies conducted by JICA eventually get funded by
OECF loans.
- 13-
objectives of Japan's ODA program. The heavy weight of aid to Indonesia is
significantly based on this concept.
Chart 1-1. Sectoral Distribution of OECF Loans to Indonesia, 1993
24.68% Non-
project
23.48%
Transportation
8.29%
Industrial
sector
9.89%
Irrigation,
water control
18.98% Power
generation, Gas
(Source: OECF Annual Report, 1993)
The major portion of OECF loans (86.7% in 1993) to Indonesia are
currently "CGI loans," which are approved by the donor group called the
Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI). This donor group was created after the
demise of the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia), which used to be
chaired by the Netherlands6 . Each year, Japan pledges its contribution at the
6This took place after the incident of East Timor in November 1991, which damaged the
relationship between the government of Netherlands and Indonesia. After termination of
colonization by Portugal, Indonesia made East Timor the 27th province of Indonesia in 1976.
However, the UN Security Council considered this a military invasion and the General Assembly
also passed resolution to support self-governance and independence of East Timor. An incident
in Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the Provincial Capital of East Timor, took place in 1991, in which
the Indonesian military shot citizens who engaged in demonstration against Indonesian military.
According to several different sources of information, more than 100 citizens were killed. The
incident was reported as a major human rights violation, and Dutch, Canadian and Denmark
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annual meeting of this donor group, normally held in June. The annual loan
disbursement schedule of OECF to Indonesia is fairly fixed, unless some
extraordinary conditions emerge. The majority of CGI loans are allocated to
finance projects (about 75% in 1993). Historically, the project loans have been
concentrated on infrastructure projects in three main sectors: transportation,
power and water control/irrigation (Chart 1-1.). The cumulative loan amount by
the financial year 1993 for these three sectors amounted to about 50% of the
aggregate amount of loans approved for Indonesia (OECF Annual Report, 1993).
1.4. History of the project and the resettled villages
The involuntary resettlement case that I examine in this thesis was
induced by a hydroelectric dam project located on the border of two Provinces,
West Sumatra and Riau, Indonesia. The major reservoir area is the
Kecamatan ? XIII Koto Kampar, which is located on the west end of the Province
of Riau. The Kampar Kanan River flows from the west to the east of this
Kecamatan , and all of the 13 villages in the Kecamatan are located along the river.
Riau produces nearly fifty percent of Indonesian oil. Despite the large
contribution of the Province to the foreign exchange earnings of Indonesia, its
infrastructure was relatively underdeveloped and the electrification rate was
only about 10% in the mid 1980s. Diesel engine generators were widely used in
urban areas. The demand for electricity has been growing rapidly since the mid-
1970s, and an annual average of 18% to 19% increase in electricity demand until
the year 2000 was forecast in the feasibility study for the dam (JICA F/S, 1984).
A hydroelectric power generation project had been an objective of the Riau
policy makers for a long time.
governments suspended disbursement of new development assistance projects after this incident.
Japan continued its aid program without any interruption.
7The smallest national administrative unit of Indonesia.
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Figure 1-2. Map of the Project Area
Villages in Italics are
New Villages
1 V?>Tanjung Balit
SSumatra Island
-- ,Singapore 
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Padang Pekenbaru
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Jakarta- *-
The Kotapanjang Hydroelectric and Associated Transmission Line Project
("Kotapanjang") was planned to produce 114 MW of electrical power for
industrial use and electrification of the region. The initial project identification of
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the dam goes back to 1979. A Japanese consulting firm, Tokyo Electric Power
Services Co., Ltd. (TEPSCO), conducted a project identification and followed up
with a pre-feasibility study in 1980. Based on the result of these studies, the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) dispatched a mission in order to
assess the potential for a JICA funded feasibility study (.F/S). The F/S was
conducted from January 1982 through March 1984 with JICA funding.
Table 1-2. List of the Resettling Villages
Original Village No. of Resettlement Resettlement
Families Destination Pattern
Plau Gadang 592 Koto Ranah UPP8
Muara Mahat 447 Muara Takus UPP
Bankinang PIR9
Tanjung Alai 313 Ranah Koto UPP
Talago
Riau Batu Bersurat 1,257 Ranah Koto UPP
Talago
Muara Takus UPP
Pongkai 459 Sungai Papar UPP or PIR
Koto Tuo 599 Muara Takus UPP
Muara Takus 244 Muara Takus UPP
Gunung 241 S. Siberuang UPP
Bungsu
West Tanjung Balit 421 Rimbo Data UPP
S u m a tr a _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3 1 31 _ _ _ __Da t a I_ _ _
________Tanjung Pauh 313 Rimbo Data UPP
(Source: Quarterly Report on Environmental Issues, March, 1993, PLN)
The F/S report recommended that the project be promoted as a high
priority, but did not seriously address the problem of resettlement. The
proposed project required inundation of total ten villages, two in West Sumatra
and eight in Riau (Table 1-2.). Most of the people in these villages were farmers,
8Project Implementation Unit. It is a special resettlement pattern, which is discussed further in
Chapter III.
9Nucleus Estate Program. It is primarily consisted of palm oil plantations in Sumatra.
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who relied heavily on rubber production for their income. The F/S report
predicted inundation of 8,989 ha of arable land, 2,644 houses and displacement of
2,990 families, or 13,907 people (JICA F/S, 1984). These statistics were later
updated to 4,886 families (PLN Quarterly Report, Mar. 1993) or about 22,000
people.
The feasibility study was overly optimistic about the process of
resettlement. The study team identified nine prospective transmigration and PIR
projects1 0 to accommodate resettlement of this population, following discussions
with the Provincial Planning and Development Board (BAPPEDA) (JICA F/S,
1984). This recommendation was given in accordance with the common practice
of development-project-induced resettlement in Indonesia, to encourage the
project affected families to participate in the national transmigration program.
People who choose not to transmigrate receive basic compensation (i.e., cash and
a temporary supply of necessities) from the project, but little or no other
resettlement assistance (Indorawan Soelaiman, 1992).
The F/S report concluded that: "the BAPPEDA expressed its intention to
continue detailed planning of the transmigration of the population, with close
communication and discussion with other related agencies, such as PLN
(Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara, the National Power Authority), the
Provincial Agency of Transmigration (Dinas Transmigrasi) and the Provincial
Agency of Public Works (DPU). From these measures, [the study team] believe
that the compensation and resettlement due to inundation will not give rise to
10GOI promotes transmigration as a national demographic strategy in order to equalize the
population distribution among different islands of the archipelago. In general, agricultural
laborers and low-income farmers of densely-populated islands, Java and Bali, are encouraged to
transmigrate to outer islands. About 3.5 million people have reportedly moved with government
assistance between 1970 and 1990, another 2.5 million, spontaneously without governmental
assistance. Sumatra has been accepting the largest portion of the transmigrant population, about
62% of the total transmigrants.
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any problem. The study recommends setting up a public institution that
undertakes promotion of compensation and resettlement" (JICA F/S, 1984).
1.5. Structure of this study
This study examines both positive and negative aspects of the resettlement
program in the Kotapanjang case. The opposition movements had some positive
impacts on the planning and implementation of the resettlement program by
forcing the government of Japan and the aid agency to pay special attention to
the issue of the resettlement program. Project implementers, at least on the
formal level, reached a consensus to respect the resettlers' demands. As a result,
the physical conditions of the resettlement sites and the overall compensation
improved considerably in comparison with previous resettlement cases in
Indonesia. At the same time, the project also suffered in a major way from a lack
of commitment on the part of project implementers to earning trust of the
resettlers and to encouraging their participation. The project implementers
overly focused on the results and paid little attention to the process of the
resettlement program. This in turn even worsened the relationship between the
government and the opposition groups despite the relative superiority of the
quality of the Kotapanjang resettlement over other such cases in Indonesia.
Chapter Two provides background to understanding how the
Kotapanjang case represents the recent ODA controversy. I discuss the issues
raised during debate, with special reference to large projects, particularly dams.
I also examine the reasons why this type of controversy has become so prevalent
in Japanese society, particularly with regard to dam projects. My conclusion is
that the involuntary resettlement is the element that ODA opponents find to be
the most visible form of the inherent contradiction of development assistance.
19-
Chapter Three analyses the positive results of the ODA controversy, anti-
dam campaigns and the involvement of OECF in the resettlement program of the
Kotapanjang case. I first describe the prior "bitter experience" of GOJ in India
and in Indonesia, which had a considerable influence on Japanese policy-makers.
Then I show how anti-dam campaigns developed and how GOJ reacted to the
resistance movements and to resettlers' demands. I conclude with a summary of
the positive elements resulting from the resettlement program.
Chapter Four focuses on the negative aspects of the resettlement program.
In it, I seek to clarify why the resistance movements did not end despite the
considerably improved conditions of the new relocation sites and the expressed
satisfaction of the project implementers. The chapter highlights problems in the
ways by which OECF reacted to external pressure and in the lack of commitment
to earning the trust and participation of resettlers.
Finally, Chapter Five summarizes my tentative evaluation of the
resettlement case of the Kotapanjang project. In the latter half of the chapter, I
present recommendations for the Japanese aid agencies, based on the
resettlement procedure analysis used in the Kotapanjang case.
1.6. Methods/Limitations of the Study
I conducted interviews with 27 people in Japan and in Indonesia with
Japanese aid agency officials, Indonesian government officials, Japanese NGOs,
Indonesian NGOs, consultants, researchers and journalists during summer, and
in fall, 1993. I also briefly visited the resettling villages both in Riau and in West
Sumatra in August 1993, although I had little chance to interview the villagers. I
had intended to interview resettlers in Riau during January 1994, but this was not
possible due to a reluctance of the project implementers to accept researchers in
the field at that time. Therefore, to my regret, the resettlers' perspective is not
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included in this study. Much of my information is obtained from project
documents, magazine and newspaper articles, as well as writings of the NGO
communities.
In addition to the information obtained through interviews, I rely heavily
on the resettlement literature, a major portion of which is written by the
resettlement experts involved in the World Bank projects. In terms of project
information, I draw from newspaper and magazine articles, official project
documents, internal memos of the NGOs, as well as previous research on the
Kotapanjang project.
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Chapter II. The ODA Controversy over Dam Projects and Involuntary
Resettlement
The ODA budget has been the Japanese government's fastest growing
budget item for over a decade, but domestic support for the development
program is questionable. In this chapter, I outline how the involuntary
resettlement issue, particularly the focus on resettlers' participation, emerged
recently as an ODA controversy in Japan. I will first discuss the background of
the ODA controversy, why the debate has been so active in Japan and, why, in
particular, dam projects have often been a target. I will then discuss why
resettlers' participation is a central issue in the context of the ODA controversy.
2.1. Characteristics of Japan's ODA policy
An obvious reason why ODA has attracted so much attention within
Japan lies in the agencies rapidly growing budget. The media refers to the ODA
budget as "sacred," implying that its growth is considered to be justified by the
government regardless of what happens to the other budget items (Chart 2-1.).
As the international pressure grows on Japan to take on a larger portion of the
burden of assisting developing countries, the government of Japan has to further
expand the budget so that it gets closer to the DAC recommended level of
contribution. The DAC recommends that countries contribute an amount equal
to 0.7% of GNP. The current level of Japan's contribution is approximately 0.35%
of GNP. The target of the government in the Fifth Five Year Plan is to implement
about US $14 billion worth of projects annually during the period between the
1993 and 1997. The amount in the 1993 budget is about US $10 billion.
Therefore, the trend is clearly toward further expansion of the program. Given
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this situation, the taxpayers' interest in the program seems logical.
Chart 2-1. Growth of Japan's ODA, 1980-1992
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Despite such rapid expansion, the Japanese government's basic policy for
development aid provision has not changed very much over the past 50 years.
The present development assistance policy of Japan is a product of its history.
The program began to distribute reparations for the Second World War to the
countries invaded by the Japanese military. The reparation was made in the
form of Japanese capital goods mainly used in infrastructure construction. As
such, the program helped Japan's export promotion policy in the 1950s and the
1960s, because the aid used to be tied directly to the purchase of Japanese goods
and services 11. Although the list of recipients has expanded considerably and
Japan is now the largest bilateral donor in the world, the tradition of "reparation"
still remains. For example, the original twelve countries to which Japan felt a
responsibility to make repayments still receive top priority as "Annually
11This is no longer true. The majority of Japan's ODA is untied.
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Consulted Countries12." Moreover, Japan follows the practice of responding to
the recipient countries' requests rather than suggesting development programs,
unlike other donors such as the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). Further, Japan does not impose conditionalities on the
disbursement of the aid money. The government announced new aid policy in
1991, in which it established four "political principles" guiding aid giving; for
example, it will not disburse loans to countries with continuous expansion of
military expenditure. However, it is not clear how these criteria will be
enforced 13.
The primary goal of Japan's aid giving has been the maintenance and
improvement of its diplomatic relationship with the recipient countries. For this
reason, GOJ has strictly refrained from actions that would be considered
interventions into the recipient country's domestic political arena.
Consequently, the ODA program has been geared toward the provision of
funding based exclusively on economic rationales. Cooperation for
infrastructure construction has been considered desirable because it is seen as
purely economic, politically neutral aid giving. In other words, GOJ appears to
assume that the economic goals of projects may be achieved without influencing
the political arena of the recipient countries. Interestingly, GOJ has attempted to
pursue its own very political, diplomatic goal through this alleged "non-political"
type of intervention.
12Countries with which GOJ holds annual meetings to discuss lists of requests for Japanese
funding. These countries receive regular funding from GOJ.
13For example, GOJ announced a suspension of new aid to Nigeria in 1994, judging that political
climate of Nigeria was diverging from democracy in a major way. -However, "democracy" is not
clearly defined by GOJ. Some argue that GOJ expresses political views on African countries
relatively freely, while it says very little regarding those in Asia (Orr and Koppel, 1993).
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2.2. Dam projects as sources of controversy
"Mega project bias"
The "mega project bias" has become the central issue in the aid
controversy. The most common arguments of the opponents of the current
program are: 1) that Japan's ODA projects have been biased towards mega
infrastructure projects, which only bring profits to the political elites of the often
non-democratic recipient countries, while failing to benefit the poor; 2) that these
large projects are tied to Japanese business interests by requiring the use of
Japanese contractors and consultants, and the purchase of goods made in Japan.
Both of these arguments attack the "mega-project bias" of the ODA program.
The controversy began with the "Marcos conspiracy" in 1986, in which
questionable actions by major Japanese trading companies and manufacturers
were raised by the US Congress during its review of the acquired financial
documents of the former Philippine President Marcos. These firms were
reported to have systematically bribed President Marcos to win bidding for
projects under Japan's development assistance program. The Marcos incident
triggered a wave of controversy; much of the media's criticisms directed at the
ODA program since then have concentrated on the issue of political corruption
and the Japanese companies' self-serving behavior. The "theory of corruption"
developed by the media suggests that projects are bound to be large in order to
profit political elites and Japanese businesses. Critics highlight the discrepancy
between the stated goals of the program, which is to serve the economic
development of the developing countries, and the "revealed" reality.
There is also a different aspect of the critique which concerns the stated
goal of development itself. Some people are concerned that current style of
development intervention may not be always considered desirable by some
others in the society, particularly when such intervention is not implemented in a
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justifiable manner from the perspective of the grassroots population. When
certain "planned change" is brought about by a foreign institution under the
name of "development," the gap between the community's goals and actual
change brought about from the outside can be so large that it may not represent
development from the community's point of view. No society remains static
over time. However, changes can result from internal or external actions. An
internal change would include: "a Mexican farmer who visits a friend in another
village, notices that he is using chemical fertilizer, asks about its use, its cost,
where it can be obtained, and then returns home and applies some to his field, is
engaged in planned change" (Foster, 1969). When an outside institution comes
in with authority to bring "planned changes" in, rather than individuals of the
community bringing them about on their own, a gap emerges between the result
desired by the community and the actual output of such institutional
intervention. The more distant from the community and the greater the
authority of the intervening institution, the larger the gap can become.
Obviously, when the institution is a foreign donor agency, the potential for a
large gap is high. When change is planned with a larger geographic and longer
historical perspective, parts of the plan that negatively affect certain communities
or individuals may be justified for the sake of greater benefit for the population
in other geographic areas or a future time period. The larger the power of the
agent and the scale of the planned change, the greater the possibility that a large
number of communities will be negatively affected.
In addition, there is also a critical inevitable institutional reason for Japan's
preference for "mega infrastructure projects": the Japanese aid administration is
currently incapable of shifting its project portfolio in a major way to small scale,
labor intensive efforts. On the one hand, Japan faces considerable international
pressure to increase its "burden sharing;" on the other hand, Japanese aid
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administration has a serious shortage of staff. Like the rest of the government,
development agencies are to comply with the fiscal reform program.
Consequently, the aid agencies cannot increase the number of officers
significantly in the short term. This institutional constraint leads to a
consideration of the "scale merit" of projects. "If one is financing projects, the
staff input on any particular project will obviously not increase proportionately
with the amount of money to be lent, for there are organizational economies of
scale in the size of the financing. A larger project requires less staff time per
dollar transferred than a smaller one, so there is a tendency for the financing
organization to gravitate toward larger projects" (Tendler, 1975). Although
Tendler made this statement about the USAID two decades ago, the same logic
applies today to Japanese aid agencies, particularly the OECF. In fact, the
organizational demand for "scale merit" is probably much stronger than the
situation of USAID back then. The total number of staff of JICA and OECF is
about a third that of USAID. OECF disbursed about 6 billion US dollars of loans
in the financial year 1992 and had only 303 staff to handle all of the work. These
statistics indicate the strong demand for "scale merit," that is, large projects.
The core of the criticism directed toward the "mega project bias" of Japan's
ODA concerns the ignorance and/or insensitivity of the policy makers and the
aid agencies of their own power to bring about changes in the lives of people in
the recipient countries. Historically, Japan simply assisted in providing
"changes" that were already judged "good" from the recipient government's
perspective. Clear negative impacts of projects were labeled as "domestic affairs"
of the recipient government and Japan restrained itself from becoming involved
in them. While such a principle is welcomed by recipient governments,
considering the considerable impact of large scale projects on society, both
negative and positive, there is no such thing as "purely economic" aid giving.
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Aid-giving clearly involves a conscious political choice or at least, political
acceptance regarding the direction of change of the society--and who will benefit
and who will lose. Critics rightly assert that failure to acknowledge such
inevitable political aspects of aid giving is simply not acceptable from the
Japanese taxpayers' perspective.
Attacks on dam projects
Dam projects symbolize the negative side of large scale interventions due
to their often strikingly visible negative environmental and social impacts,
particularly the displacement of large numbers of people. Resettlement in
particular is one of clearest forms of the trade-offs between development policy
and individual welfare. This trade-off is most acutely perceived at the grassroots
level, often by those without much political voice.
One of the issues often raised by ODA opponents is the question about
who the program is trying to benefit. "The present ODA program requires a
fundamental reform, focusing on the clarification of who the beneficiaries
are...Japan should stop aid projects developed by a "top-down" decision making
process" (Sumi, 2/1992). Opponents call for "bottom-up" decision making of
projects and the promotion of smaller scale projects that do not incur large costs
of "development" by displacing people. Although the arguments are problematic
because of their over-generalization, they carry one strong message, that dam
projects have not adequately taken into account their true cost.
In addition to benefits of dams, such as increased power supply, water
control and irrigation, dams also incur costs, most visibly in the form of forced
resettlement. It is questionable whether development planners have adequately
recognized true costs of such projects and attempted to minimize them. There
has been little serious effort expended by the government of Japan in most
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projects to quantify the impact of forced resettlement. The major reason again, is
that resettlement is regarded as a domestic affair of recipient countries.
2.3. Historical cases of involuntary resettlement in Japan
The "non-political" position of the government of Japan in effect allows the
recipient government to be sole judge of the desirability of development projects.
This situation parallels the style of economic development historically common
in Japan: centralized decision making by the Ministries that reflects little input
from the grassroots level. Economic development policy and reconstruction of
the nation after the Second World War were implemented with tremendous
support from the entire nation. In a country where nearly every institution had
collapsed, economic development had an ideological legitimacy to reunite the
nation. People lost everything at the end of the war including the fundamental
ideology of "the holy body of nation," which had united the country during the
period of military rule and suffering from the war. Improvement of the material
well-being was perceived as the single goal. Therefore, development projects of
the government earned such strong support that individuals and communities
that suffered from the policy had to make way for the greater benefit of the
society.
Because the "income doubling" policy was so successful, GOJ, by and
large, did not have to face the problem of negative impacts at the grassroots
level. An exception to the rule occurred in the case of Sanrizuka1 4, a violent
protest case against construction of Narita Airport, which lasted over a period of
25 years. This case began in 1965, when the government selected the site for a
new airport without consulting the local people.
14The name of the village displaced by the Narita Airport construction.
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[From the farmers' points of view, ] the lack of consultation was
outrageous--an act of aggression against them and their way of life.
But clearly there was principle on the government side as well. In
line with its industrialization policy, it wanted to drive small
farmers off the land and into the industrial labor force in order to
raise incomes, something the government regarded as a self-
evident benefit to all (Apter, 1987).
The government was from the very beginning perfectly willing to negotiate with
the farmers regarding the compensation rates. However, the government could
not understand the principles for which the opposition coalitions--farmers,
students and political activists-were united. The opponents stood against the
government with non-economic principles such as the values of community and
the traditional agrarian life styles. The government was so obsessed with the
idea that economic development was a self evident good to everyone that it
could neither see nor understand any other logic. Cash compensation and
provision of income earning opportunity were the only "serious enough" issues
to negotiate.
It was not until October 1993 that the last remaining 10 families signed an
agreement for resettlement. According to one newspaper article, this was the
first case of resettlement related to the Narita Airport construction in which a
community as a whole resettled together. Previous resettlement was in principle
resettlement of each family separately, which led to the destruction of
community. The newspaper reported a comment of the Chairman of The Tokyo
New International Airport Public Corporation, "I feel it is necessary to equally
value the welfare of the surrounding communities and the airport construction
plan. We need to find out ways by which both community and the airport can
survive together." This was referred to as a "new" direction of the public
corporation. After 28 years of struggles, the public corporation and the Ministry
of Transportation finally learned that it was important to listen to the people in
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the resettling communities and that "it is important for the farming community
to stay together in the new resettlement site." The Public Corporation decided to
provide basic infrastructure, such as road, water and sewage systems to the new
community. Such service provision was not an issue when individual
households had to relocate by themselves with cash compensation, because the
Public Corporation was not concerned about where these families relocated.
(Yomiuri Shinbun, Nov. 13,1993).
The Sanrizuka experience also highlights three problems of GOJ's
historical project development style. The problems are also clearly observed in
the dam construction projects in Japan, which were strongly promoted
particularly in the 1950s and the 1960s as a core national development policy.
First, there was a lack of consultation. "Once the Ministry determines a location
as a prospective dam site, the project plan has been forcefully implemented no
matter how much the residents resists the idea, with a variety of "tricks" for
persuasion over a long period of time. There has been almost no precedent for
the construction plan to be canceled due to resistance movements" (Watanabe,
1980). "[The residents] were startled to learn about the construction plan of [a
huge dam] for the first time in the newspaper (Chishima, 1980).
Second, the concept of compensation was largely reduced to an amount of
cash. While the compensation standard was determined in the Law of 1953 (later
replaced by a law of 197315), which called for both cash compensation as well as
replacement of assets, GOJ generally did not pay attention to sustaining farming
communities. The government assumed that resettling families would move to
urban areas and be employed in the new industrial sector. Therefore,
"preservation of community" or "continuation of traditional industry" was not an
15This is called Suigenchi Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochi-hou (Special Act of Measures to be Taken for the
Headwater Regions).
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issue from the perspective of the government. The general attitude of the society
also supported such a view; while the sentimental value of the old village was
understandable, it was not a large enough issue to question the governmental
policy.
Third, as a result of the governmental policy, which encouraged
individual migration of the resettlers to the urban areas, development-induced
relocation not only spurred the destruction of agrarian economies and movement
of people from the entire region, but it also led to impoverishment of a great
number of resettlers. "Compensation money temporarily supported the
resettlers, but they were cut-off from the relatives and old friends, land and local
culture, which made job opportunities difficult to find. Nor was it possible to
find replacement land. These led to lives characterized by everything else but
stability" (Chishima, 1980). "Previously, the structure of the community had
capacity to salvage a few 'drowning' members. However, the compensation
money cut those ties and each resettler stood on his own in new community
independently. Now, there is no one who can help these people when they are in
trouble" (Takamatsu, 1962). The neglect of a grassroots voice has been an aspect
of the successful economic development policy of the Japanese government.
I have a strong sense that the policy makers of Japan are, consciously or
unconsciously, permitting similar "development styles" in the projects under the
ODA program. The neglect of the grassroots voice, even if not overtly
recommended, may be permitted because Japan also experienced the same
neglect. I fear that there may be a bureaucratic culture existing in GOJ that
allows this type of logic to prevail.
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2.3. Resettlers' participation
What then, has been lacking in Japan's overseas development strategy?
Obviously, it is the role of the resettlers themselves in the process of decision
making and implementation of resettlement. There is a need to set up a
mechanism so that the voice of these people be heard. Even when the necessity
of displacement is supported by alternative studies, it does not automatically
follow that these people should suffer for the greater good of the majority.
Instead, we need to establish how a mechanism can be set up to allow the
resettlers have an adequate say about their own future. This, in short, is why a
policy is necessary to ensure resettlers' participation.
"It is perhaps oxymoronic to speak of 'participation' in reservoir-driven
relocation, since the move is inherently involuntary" (Horowitz, 1993).
"Participation" of "involuntary resettlers" indeed looks like a semantic
contradiction. Although "participatory development" has been a buzz word for a
number of years, and has been on agenda of a number of development programs,
only a limited number of success stories have been reported to date. One could
list various reasons for this: that participation takes time and does not fit into the
timetable of implementation agencies; that people are often not interested in
collaborative work unless immediate benefits are known, etc. Participation is
usually sought for projects that are supposed to benefit a particular population,
and it is difficult to achieve even when the entire project benefits the community.
In the case of involuntary resettlement, however, the situation is more difficult
because the development project hurts the presumed participants, and for this
reason there is an inherent antagonistic relationship between the executing
agency and the resettlers. "Yet successful resettlement depends in very large part
on an active participation of those forced to move" (Horowitz, 1993).
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An important point made in the literature is that the full potential of all
participating groups can be mobilized only if resettlers participate in all stages of
project design, implementation, and monitoring (Humdsalz quoted by Gulyani,
1992; Cernea, 1988;1990, Partridge, 1993). To understand the process, it is useful
to divide it into two stages: the trust building and information dissemination
stage, and the actual participation in planning and implementation.
The trust building and information dissemination
Resettlers' participation has to start with a full acknowledgment of the
antagonistic relationship between the resettlers and the executing agencies.
Therefore, the first step of participation has to be the creation of "trust" between
the executing agency and the resettlers. Although initial resistance is normal and
should be expected, "the lack of accurate information can exacerbate
misunderstanding and strengthen resistance" (Cernea, 1990). Experience
suggests that dialogue in the preparation stage is key to constructing the
foundation of a relationship between the resettlers and the project planners.
Partridge reports a case of hydroelectric project in Costa Rica where
participatory advance planning played an important role in avoiding negative
consequences (Partridge, 1993). Resettlement preparation activities, which
started two years before the funding for the dam was secured, consisted of four
phases: 1) ethnographic sample survey of communities, 2) information
campaign and meetings with families, 3) census of people and property affected,
4) making public the planning data. Together with the effort to learn about the
resettling population, the planners promised the people consultation in planning
of the process. Bartolome writes about a case in Argentina, where as a result of
numerous consultations (annual average of 2,493 for the period between 1983
and 1988) the affected population no longer questioned the need to be relocated,
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but rather, wanted to be resettled as soon as possible (Bartolome, 1993).
Guggenheim highlights another example of a hydroelectric project in Mexico,
where, as a result of continuous consultation meetings, not only was the
confrontational atmosphere dissipated, but the former anti-dam opposition
group also became a negotiation partner through which the power company
could communicate with the affected population (Guggenheim, 1993). In all of
these cases, initial dialogue served to build trust between the implementation
agency and the resettlers. Patient effort at communication can turn "resistance"
into "negotiation."
Lack of visible resistance is not necessarily a positive sign, as the resettlers
may choose to keep silent because they do not know how to appeal or are
hesitant to do so due to social and cultural constraints, which can result in a
disastrous consequences in later stages (Holden, 1990). Also, it is important to
realize that people may change their preferences as the actual resettlement comes
closer (Holden, 1990). People tend to maintain a "business-as-usual--it can't
happen to us" reaction to a possible relocation until the end. Therefore, it is often
the case that they realize the reality and their true needs only at the later stages of
the dialogue 16. Therefore, while the dialogue should start early, there must
always be flexibility to accommodate changes in the resettlers' ideas. Two-way
communication is critical in this initial stage. Planners need to learn about the
resettlers' needs, resources and preferences in order to prevent costly mistakes;
the resettlers can reduce the degree of anxiety by obtaining the correct
information on the project from the responsible agency. Through continuous
dialogue, the initial antagonistic relationship is likely to be improved. This is the
prerequisite for the participation in the next stage.
16An example of Kedung Ombo is discussed in Chapter III.
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Resettlers' participation in planning and implementation
At a practical level, implementing agencies need resettlers' participation in
planning (e.g. selection of the sites, layout of the community, housing design)
and implementation (e.g. construction of houses, preparation of land for
agriculture), since the agencies "have neither manpower nor experience to do the
whole job" (Humdsalz quoted by Gulyani, 1992). This dialogue develops into a
negotiation of substantive planning issues. Guggenheim provides an example in
which a local objection to the implementation agency began to present counter-
proposals to specific elements of the plan, such as "replacement housing styles,
types of improvements needed on the replacement lands, location of replacement
villages and rights of the landless" (Guggenheim, 1993). Sometimes, the
resettlers themselves recognize the opportunities to improve their lives in the
new sites, once they accept the basic elements of the plan. For example,
Guggenheim found that people preferred to choose new housing styles as
opposed to traditional ones (Guggenheim, 1993). This shows that while it is
important to respect the traditional community structure and cultural elements
of the resettlers, it is not always "right" from the view point of the resettlers, once
they accept to move and live in a new reality.
Participation helps to determine the exact needs of the people and thereby
motivates them to contribute to the construction of their new community. In the
case of the hydroelectric project in Costa Rica, popular votes were taken about
the selection of site, and the planning of new settlements incorporated opinions
and wishes of the displaced population gathered through studies which were
discussed, modified and approved during meetings. In addition, groups of
families organized by social workers and community promoters participated in
such community tasks as construction of a church and the arrangement of
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services, the provision of school facilities, such as desks and chairs, and the
arrangement of agricultural extension meetings (Partridge, 1993). The benefit of
the participatory work was not limited to non-confrontational resettlement
operations. Experience shows that the participation made planning and
implementation more effective in meeting the resettlers' needs and preferences.
Equally important, people positively contributed to re-establishment of their
communities, instead of being driven away by the "dependency syndrome."
While patience is definitely a key to the success of participatory planning and
implementation of resettlement operations, the evidence shows that the
difference in the results of the entire operation well deserve the considerable
investment by the responsible agency.
2.5. Summary
Since dam projects are typical development projects financed by Japan,
resulting forced resettlement is also a common problem. While it is well known
that poor management itself creates many problems of resettlement, Japan has,
for a long time, avoided taking active measures to prevent or minimize certain
costs of development that its assistance program creates. This is the most
frequently cited criticism of the ODA by its opponents. The ODA controversy
reflects a concern about the ways development projects were built in Japan
during its rapid economic growth period in the 1950s and the 1960s. A peculiar
social environment and a centralized decision making style facilitated Japan's
rapid reconstruction. However, while the economic development success of
Japan is well respected, the replication of its decision making style of project
development elsewhere should be questioned. If development assistance,
consciously or unconsciously, replicates the decision making process of the
donor country, it is far from the "non-political" type of intervention allegedly
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followed by the government of Japan in its aid giving. I believe that choice of the
process is at least as important as the goals of development. The Japanese aid
agency and policy makers need to seriously reexamine their own policies on this
issue. In such reexamination, policy-makers should remember that the success of
resettlement and the minimization of costs of development depends on how
successfully the project hears the resettlers' voice and earns their participation.
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Chapter III. Some Positive Impacts of the Controversy
--Did it help for the resettlers'voice to be heard?--
The government of Japan pledged a loan for the Kotapanjang dam at the
annual meeting of the Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) in 1990.
The loan covered 60% of the total construction cost of 250 million dollars. A few
months earlier, while OECF was conducting the appraisal for the dam project, a
news paper reported that the project could create an environmental problem by
displacing rare Sumatran elephants to make way for the reservoir. The news
paper also said that the conditions of the resettlement site planned for these
elephants were not very favorable for their survival (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 4.16.
90). Soon afterwards, it was revealed that 10 villages would have to be resettled.
The resettlement of these villages became the focus of the controversy. In the
context of the whole ODA debate, this media report triggered an anti-
construction movement among NGOs in Japan. Japanese environmental and
ODA-watchdog NGOs made an alliance with NGOs based in Jakarta and Riau
and started resistance movements to block the Kotapanjang construction plans.
In this chapter, I describe how these anti-dam campaigns by the Indonesian-
Japanese NGO alliance had contributed to producing some relatively positive
outcomes of the resettlement program.
3.1. Prior bitter experiences of the government of Japan
NGOs and the Japanese government officials shared experiences from
several prior important dam project cases. Two of the most significant projects
were the Sardar Sarobar dam in India and the Kedung Ombo dam in Central
Java, Indonesia. The perceived "failure" in these projects from the GOJ's
perspective was important, because every party involved in the Kotapanjang
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case remembered these two cases. The media and the NGOs, as well as OECF
and MoFA, emphasized that they did not want to repeat the mistakes of Sardar
Sarovar and Kedung Ombo. What then were the lessons that the government of
Japan learned from these prior cases?
The case of Sardar Sarovar dam
Sardar Sarovar project was planned as a part of Narmada Valley Project, a
long-term (40-50 years for completion) regional development project which
included the construction of 30 large-scale, 135 medium-scale and more than
3,000 small-scale dams for irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. If all of
these dams are constructed as planned, a total of 350,000 ha of forest and 200,000
ha of arable land are expected to be inundated. This will entail the displacement
of more than one million people.
The Sardar Sarovar project consisted of two components: construction of
a dam and power plant, and irrigation canals. The Sardar Sarovar dam required
the inundation of 234 villages and the displacement of 100,000 people; the
irrigation canals were expected to displace 50,000 people. The project, however,
was supposed to benefit millions of people by the irrigation and power
generation. In May, 1985, the World Bank pledged a loan of 450 million dollars:
$300 million for construction of dams and $150 million for canals (Morse and
Berger, 1992). The government of Japan participated under a co-financing
scheme with the World Bank to finance the construction of the power plant of
this project, committing an OECF loan of about $20 million (Sumi, 1990).
Construction of the project began in 1987, before the planning of the
resettlement program by the Indian government had been completed. This
triggered grassroots resistance in India, supported by campaigns of international
environmental NGOs. NGO campaigns in Japan, calling for cancellation of the
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OECF loan for the power plant started in 1989. The media and NGO campaign
were unusually active in Japan, with strong support from the international NGO
network opposed to the project. A number of public hearings, meetings of the
NGOs with government officials and demonstrations in front of the MOF
buildings highlighted the controversy. In addition, and quite importantly, the
issue was brought up a number of times in the National Diet by members who
sympathized with the NGO activities 17. As a result, the government announced
cancellation of the loan in June 1990 at a donor group meeting18.
This was the first time the Japanese government canceled an already
pledged loan. The cancellation of the loan not only disappointed the Indian
government, but more seriously, called into question the credibility of the
Japanese government, particularly of the MoFA. Given that one of the major
objectives of the ODA program was the strengthening of diplomatic relationships
with recipient countries, the cancellation of the pledged loan was seen by seen by
the GOJ as the worst mistake that it could commit. The NGOs criticized the
OECF for its lack of first hand information about the site, as the agency had
trusted the decision made by the World Bank. The OECF, in particular, relied
completely on the World Bank's environmental assessment, which is normal for
OECF in cases involving co-financing with the World Bank. In contrast, NGO
opponents were backed by strong information and other support from the
international network of environmental groups.
17Unlike the case of the US, there is no obligation for the aid implementation agencies in Japan to
report directly to the Diet on their performance. Therefore, unless the Diet members bring up an
issue about specific project, no discussion is held in the Diet.
181n a formal legal terms, Japan "suspended" an early tranche of the loan until the resettlement
issue was dealt with and an informal arrangement was made with the government of India, so
that the later tranche of the loan would not be formally requested. Therefore, in effect, the loan
was cancelled.
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Cancellation of the loan was seen by the Japanese government as a formal
surrender of the government to the NGO campaigns. Therefore, GOJ perceived
the mistake of this case as the cancellation of the loan, rather than as a lack of
environmental policy of the aid agency. MoFA in particular can not afford to
commit another similar "mistake" from a diplomatic point of view. MoFA badly
needed public support for its ODA program, and repetition of such mistake
could endanger the continuation of the program. From the opponents' point of
view, however, the case was a rare visible success for the NGOs. Therefore, in
this particular battle, there were clear winners and losers.
What were the lessons that GOJ learned from this case? First, OECF staff
learned that NGO campaigns and questions in the Diet implied an extremely
high time cost for them. The officers in charge spent a great deal of time putting
together information and preparing papers in order to answer the questions
raised in the Diet and in meeting with NGOs. In addition, MoFA and OECF
learned the danger of not being able to disburse a loan because of NGO
resistance. However, because the debate was so focused on whether GOJ should
finance the project or not, there was not enough substantive discussion of the
GOJ's responsibility in the resettlement. With cancellation of funding, the
problem seemed to be treated as over. The case seemed to be remembered
simply as a successful struggle of the NGOs and did not give rise to
consideration of more fundamental policy issues of the GOJ regarding
involuntary resettlement.
The Case of Kedung Ombo Dam
The Kedung Ombo Dam was built for the purposes of flood control and
hydroelectric power generation, as well as industrial and domestic water supply
to an area of more than 59,000 ha in the Serang River basin in North Central Java,
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Indonesia. It required acquisition of 5,898 ha of land, which before the flooding
began, housed between 25,000 and 30,000 people. (Inside Indonesia, April
1989). The construction was completed in 1989 and the water gate was closed to
start flooding the reservoir. Again, however, this occurred before the
resettlement problem had been dealt with. "[S]ome 1,500 families, or about 7,000
people, out of the total of about 5,400 families, 23,400 people, refused to resettle
from the inundated villages and continued to stay on the embankments of the
flooding reservoir" (Inside Indonesia, Apr. 1989). There were a number of
protest movements aided by Indonesian university students. Over 700 families
remained in the dam area more than one year after the flooding of the reservoir
"living in makeshift villages they had built on higher ground around the edges of
their flooded land" (TAPOL Bulletin No. 99, June 1990).
The overall cost of the scheme was more than US $250 million, 74% of
which was financed by the World Bank. Japan provided a concessionary loan
through the Export Import Bank of Japan, not through the ODA scheme.
Nevertheless, this fund also consisted in part of official capital transfer to
developing countries. The amount of the loan disbursed by the Export Import
Bank of Japan was $50 million (Record of Discussion, Committee of Ministry of
Finance, 1989, 6.16). This incident of flooding the reservoir while the villagers
were still residing on the site caught the attention of international NGOs and
attracted wide media coverage as a case of human rights violation.
Why did the Indonesian government, or the Ministry of Public Works in
this particular case, commit such an obvious mistake? The most important
reason was that people did not actually transmigrate to an outer island, contrary
to the statistical records that the Indonesian government held. As in most of the
development-project-induced resettlement cases in Indonesia, people were
forced to choose between Transmigration and cash compensation. A choice of
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cash compensation meant that people had to purchase land and find means to
reconstruct their lives by themselves, although the compensation was usually not
enough to purchase comparable replacement land. On the other hand, the choice
of Transmigration usually meant life in an entirely unfamiliar environment far
from the original village. In this latter case, the government provided basic
infrastructure and some economic resources, such as palm and rubber trees or
employment on a plantation. According to a consultant report, in a survey
conducted in 1973 at an early stage of the project, 75% of the people expressed
preference to participate in the national Transmigration Program, rather than to
self migrate with the cash compensation (Butcher, 1988). The Indonesian
government, however, expected that an even higher percentage of people (90% of
the population) would transmigrate "based on experience from other such
projects in Central Java" (Butcher, 1988). However, in the end, many people did
not participate in the Transmigration Program.
So what did the Japanese government learn from this case? An OECF
official told me that one important lesson that OECF learned from Kedung Ombo
case was the importance of determining and fixing the number of eligible
families to receive compensation as of a certain cut-off date. The Indonesian
government found that two things happened to explain why many people
remained in the reservoir area despite the fact that the Transmigration budget for
about 4,000 families had been spent and that the Ministry of Transmigration's
record said that they provided service to these 4,000 families. First, the
households broke down into smaller units of different generations and the
households composed of younger people participated in theTransmigration
Program while the older people remained on the reservoir. Second, people
moved from surrounding villages to the reservoir area and squatted, expecting to
receive compensation. These problems occurred because the GOI did not clearly
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identify which families were eligible to receive compensation and did not fix the
number of families. A World Bank memorandum on the Kedung Ombo
resettlement issue notes that "in order to serve the objectives of involuntary
resettlement, Transmigration procedures would have to be modified so that
entire households (three generations living together) are transmigrated as a unit
(Partridge, 1989). The most important lesson that OECF learned, I was told, was
that the list of families eligible to receive compensation has to be fixed as of
certain date so that the government does not give people chances to "cheat" and
try to get more compensation.
From the above, I argue that while GOJ learned a hard lesson from the
Sardar Sarovar and the case Kedung Ombo, that displacement and international
NGO resistance can develop into a major threat, neither case gave GOJ an
opportunity to take a close look at the fundamental causes of the resistance and
their own policies on involuntary resettlement.
3.2. The campaign against the Kotapanjang project
Villagers of the project-affected villages first learned about the project plan
in 1983 during the feasibility study for the project, which was conducted with
JICA funding. According to a report, "residents of the eight villages to be
inundated in the sub-district XIII Koto Kampar in Riau, first heard about the
proposed reservoir from researchers who came from Andalas University in
Padan, West Sumatera," who visited the area to conduct an Environmental
Impact Analysis (Aditjondro, 1991):
Initially, the villagers were totally against the project. Therefore,
during the month of Ramadhan of 1983, sub-district officials made
special efforts to convince the village leaders about the importance
of Kotopanjang. After a lot of discussions, on 19 December 1983,
fifty elders from the eight Riau villages which were to be inundated
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signed a petition in the sub-district capital, Batu Bersurat. In that
historical petition, they accepted the construction of that dam,
under 17 conditions...Whatever other commitments some leaders
signed in later year, there were always other leaders who kept
returning to the 1983 petition. Probably, the fact that it was
voluntarily signed by 50 clan chiefs, religious leaders, and formal
leaders in Darussalam, a well-known Islamic institution in the sub
district capital, gave the petition its own legitimacy (Aditjondro,
1991).
The 1983 resolution stated conditions such as that the new settlement site
should be along the road near the reservoir shoreline, that the land that was not
inundated would remain in control of the community, and that all of the
culturally and religiously important graves would be spared from inundation
(Appendix I). I first wondered how this consensus was reached, considering
the difficulties involved in traveling and communicating with one another
among geographically dispersed villages. At this point, the villagers did not
have any contact with outside support groups. Although there remains a
possibility that the village leaders may have asked for the assistance of
sympathetic local intellectuals in formulation of the written form of resolution, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the content of the resolution reflects the
genuine representation of the consensus voluntarily reached among the village
leaders at that time.
According to an interview with a consultant, another appeal from the
villagers was made in 1987, confirming that they wished to move to locations
surrounding the reservoir. A reply from the Provincial government was not
given to either of the appeals. The stated reason for this is that no formal
approval for the project at the central level was made at either of these times.
The government started discussions with the villages in 1989, when the
approval process advanced from the Provincial level to the central government
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level, and a Presidential decree was issued to the Provincial Governor indicating
that the central government wanted to proceed with the project.
The media coverage on Kotapanjang in Japan, which was in large part
regarding the relocation of the Sumatran elephants, appeared in April 1990,
while the OECF appraisal of the project was being conducted. MoFA reacted
sharply to this news report, demonstrating a concern over proceeding with this
project. The discussions on the problems of Kotapanjang within MoFA and
OECF began almost immediately after the media coverage began.
In the meantime, in August 1990, a group of ODA watchers led by Prof.
Kazuo Sumi conducted a private investigation of the project. The investigation
mission was joined by Ms. Akiko Domoto, a Diet Member of the Socialist Party.
Upon returning from the mission, they made recommendations to OECF to
reconsider funding of the project. The same group of people who led the Sardar
Sarovar campaign made the same recommendation to the OECF. At this time,
reasons for such a recommendation were: 1) that construction of the dam would
necessitate the relocation of a large population; 2) that the reservoir area is
inhabited by rare Sumatra elephants; 3) that Muara Taks ruins, a tenth century
Buddhist temple near Kotapanjang, would be damaged by the project; and 4)
that the project-affected villagers were not informed that the project is funded
under the development assistance program of Japan.
However, serious resistance against the project did not begin to build until
1991, after the agreement for resettlement was signed by each household. The
focus of the controversy was the way in which the villagers signed the agreement
for resettlement. PLN (Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara, the National Electric
Power Authority) and the Provincial government called for a meeting with
village leaders in order to obtain signed evidence of agreement, which
determined the compensation rates for various kinds of assets, such as house,
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land, and rubber and other trees with economic values. It is not clear from the
available information whether the Provincial government tried to keep this
meeting secret from the rest of the village members, but it is reported that many
villagers did not know about the meeting until later. Along with agreement on
the compensation rates obtained from village leaders, the land acquisition
committee of the Provincial government started in February to obtain signatures
from each household agreeing to the resettlement, together with lists of assets
subject to compensation under the resettlement program. When the agreement
Table 3-1. Comparisons of the Compensation Rates-1.
Compensation Rate Assessed Value Resettlers'
Demands
Item (Plaugadang)
Rp. US$ Rp. Rp.
1US$=210ORp.
A. Buildings
(Rp./m2)
1)Permanent 74,000-192,000 35-91 350,000
2)Semi- 42,000-80,000 21-38 300,000
permanent
3)Temporary 25,000-48,000 12-23 100,000
B. Land
(Rp./Unit)
1)House-Yard 450-750 0.21-0.36 7,000
2)Rice Field 400-600 0.19-0.29 2,000 15,000
3)Plantation 30-50 0.01 3,000
4)Dry-land 40 0.01 500 1,000
5)Other land 30 0.01
6)Cemetery 75,000 36
C. Plant
(Rp./tree)
1)Rubber 1,250-4,200 0.59-2 15,000
2)Coconut 1,500-4,800 0.71-2 8,000 40,000
3)Clove 1,500-4,675 0.71-2
4)Coffee 500-1,760 0.23-0.84
5)Rambutan 2,000-9,000 0.95-4
6)Durian 2,000-9,900 0.95-4,
(Source: "Answers to Questionnaire," submitted by PLN to OECF, 1991; Friends of the Earth
Japan)
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signed by village leaders concerning the compensation rate became known to
the villagers, it triggered efforts to appeal and request the invalidation of the
agreement. The "agreed" compensation rates were considerably lower than the
villagers' demands (Table 3-1.). Simultaneously, villagers, joined by the national
NGO alliance claimed that the signatures obtained from many of the households
were in fact not the results of voluntary decisions made by the villagers.
In May 1991, the first effort at resistance began in the village of Koto Tuo,
with the gathering of the signatures on an appeal to OECF. 182 signatures were
collected. It appears that both local as well as Jakarta-based NGOs were already
working with the villagers at this stage. In July, a delegation of farmers,
accompanied by SKEPHI, a Jakarta-based environmental protection group, and
other NGO members, visited the OECF office in Jakarta and submitted the
collection of signatures. The delegation informed OECF representatives that the
original agreement was obtained by force, rather than through the voluntary
agreement of the villagers.
"The delegation appealed that the agreement was obtained by force,
by giving examples of the incidents. The delegation appealed that
the villagers were threatened by the Provincial government officials
and PLN officials that unless one signs the agreement now, the
household will eternally lose the right to compensation. Another
aspect of the appeal was that there was no explanation with regard
to the compensation rate to the villagers. The village leaders signed
the agreement for compensation rate, but they are not valid. The
compensation rate is even lower than the Official Rate provided by
the Provincial government" (Asano, 1993).
In September, a delegation of farmers and NGOs lodged a protest with the
House of Representatives in Jakarta. Presenting a petition signed by 700 people
of Koto Kampar district, Kampar regency in Sumatra, the delegation reported to
the United Development Party that they were offered as little as Rp 30 (less than
one US cent) per square meter of land. The delegation also made an appeal to
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the Embassy of Japan and the OECF. These protest movements attracted wide
coverage by the media.
Following the appeal to the government agencies in Jakarta, a villager of
Batu Bersurat and an NGO activist flew to Japan at the invitation of the Japanese
NGO alliance. The Japanese NGO alliance held a symposium in two cities near
Tokyo, and the two delegations from the Kotapanjang Opposition Alliance
appealed to the Japanese citizens, saying that villagers were being forced out of
the villages without appropriate explanations from the government.
The delegation met with officers at MoFA and the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, as well as several Diet members, to demand cancellation of
Japanese funding for this project.
3.3. The resettlement program
In September 1990, MoFA decided to dispatch an OECF mission to
reinvestigate the environmental problems of the project before Exchange of
Notes and Loan Agreements were signed. A MoFA official stated that "the
purpose of the mission is to check the issues of environment and resettlement
before formal approval of the loan. This was in addition to the investigations
already made by GOI as well as OECF in order to be extremely cautious about
the decision making. We have determined to take such steps based on the prior
experience of the Narmada (Sarvar Sarovar case)" (Asano, 1993). Consequently,
these MoFA reactions were the result of lessons learned from the past experience.
Through discussions between the Indonesian government and the OECF, an
agreement was reached on the possible measures that could be taken to solve the
problems. Usually, disbursement of loans for Indonesia is conducted in a fixed
schedule, but because of these extra discussions between OECF and GOI, the
signing of Exchange of Notes and Loan Agreements took place in December
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1990, a few months later than the regular schedule. This may seem like a minor
delay, but one needs to remember the fact that Japanese bureaucratic culture
absolutely dislikes irregularity.
In the Environmental Investigation Mission preceding the signing of loan
agreement, the governments of Indonesia and Japan agreed that the GOJ would
confirm several facts in the course of the disbursement of the loan, and the GOJ
requested appropriate reporting from the GOI concerning the outcome of their
effort. The facts to be verified included: 1) signatures of consent from all
households; 2) preparation of adequate new dwelling sites; 3) consent for
compensation funds--not by one-sided government pressure, but by consent of
all dwellers, after discussion with representatives of the people; and 4) ensure a
new habitat for the elephants.
The media reported this as the first "conditionality" that the government of
Japan ever imposed on a recipient country, saying that the loan would not be
disbursed unless these conditions were met. Interviews with OECF officials
revealed that the GOJ did not say that these four points were preconditions for
disbursement of the loan. The GOJ basically declared that they would like to pay
attention to these issues but did not threaten to cancel the loan in the event that
these four conditions were not fulfilled. In a purely technical sense,
"conditionality" means a provision of the agreement that states necessary
conditions for the agreement to take effect.
Nevertheless, the media reported that this was a new policy for Japan.
Certainly, both MoFA and the OECF were both aware of the nontraditional
nature of requests that they made to the Indonesian government. In fact, my
interviews with OECF officials revealed the sensitivity of this issue. Through the
interviews, I found discrepancies in the understanding of this new policy among
the officials. Some said that it was equivalent to "conditionality" in referring to
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these requirements and others firmly refused to use the term "conditionality." In
answering questions of Ms. Domoto in the Diet, Mr. Hatakenaka, an MoFA
official, clearly denied that these were "conditionalities." (Record of Discussion,
Special Committee of Environment, 9.25.1991).
In terms of the arrangements made to enable the OECF to confirm these
issues, the OECF tried to incorporate the nontraditional requests into the regular
practices. The OECF asked the Indonesian government to submit quarterly
progress reports on environmental issues. "It was basically a part of the regular
procedures included in any project implementation that we [OECF] administer.
We simply tried to ensure that the quarterly report includes a section on the
environmental matters. But the GOI decided to do a little more than we
requested, and they produced independent reports on the environmental issues,"
said an officer in charge of the project at OECF.
In any event, by declaring a right to confirm what PLN, the
implementation agency, has done on resettlement, the OECF officer in charge of
the project examined every report that the GOI submitted. On each quarterly
progress report on environmental issues, the OECF went back to PLN with a
series of questions on the details. For example, they asked about the
compensation rates and how they compare with the other resettlement cases, and
they required submission of statistics. The list of signatures on the assets and the
agreement to move was the single most important piece of evidence that both the
GOI and GOJ recognized as the proof of the "democratic process" undertaken for
the resettlement. As for the list submitted to the OECF, the OECF officer in
charge confirmed each agreement for all 4,886 households, not only checking that
every household had signed but also confirming their preferred relocation
destinations and checking to see that there were no identical signatures for more
than one household. Through these monitoring activities of the progress of the
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resettlement during the disbursement of the loan, the OECF tried to pressure
PLN to handle the resettlement project in an appropriate manner. The OECF
also suggested to PLN that their agreement with the consultants who were
supervising the project should include the supervision of the "environmental
issues" of the project, the major component of this being resettlement. In
addition, to ensure that PLN involved a "neutral" agent in handling the
resettlement issue, I understand that OECF intended to expand accessible sources
of information regarding resettlement by involving the Japanese consultant in the
process.
Thus, for the first time, the OECF took active measures--at least based on
their historical standard-in this resettlement case. Numerous missions were
dispatched to visit the villages both from Jakarta and from Tokyo. One OECF
official told me that officers from headquarters rarely visit a project site until the
dam construction makes certain progress. He commented that "this was a special
case. People visited the villages a number of times even before dam construction
started. You know, this does not usually happen as there is nothing there [until
the dam construction starts]." This opinion clearly expresses the bias of OECF
towards considering projects simply as the "construction of hardware." The
resettlement issue of Kotapanjang reminded them of the very basic fact that
projects exist in a larger social context.
The OECF also helped to improve the quality of the resettlement program
by providing financial support for part of the program that exceeded the normal
components of the public Transmigration Program. Since the public
Transmigration Program is designed for low-income, voluntary migrants, the
standard package of services provided for the resettlement sites does not include
much infrastructure provision. However, in the resettlement site of the
Kotapanjang project, pavement of access roads, electricity and installation of
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water tanks were provided in order to maintain the standard of public service
that existed in the villages prior to resettlement. Many of these services were
above the standard of the regular Transmigration Program. Provision of some of
these above the standard services was paid for by an additional OECF loan,
provided under its Sector Loan arrangement.
3.4. Some positive outcomes
As a result of the resistance movement, the media coverage and some of
the active measures taken by GOJ, some positive outcomes emerged from the
resettlement scheme. One of the goals of the project implementers was to
improve the standard conditions of resettlement in comparison to the past
resettlement cases in Indonesia. In this context, I would like to highlight four
major achievements.
First, I consider that the most important positive effect was that the project
gave legitimacy to the resettlers' demands. The OECF requested that sincere
consideration be given to the demands of the project-affected population. The
OECF did not specify the appropriate measures and standards to judge respect of
the villagers' demands, but the OECF request played a key role in building
consensus among project implementers. Project implementers were indeed
conscious that they had to pay attention to what the villagers said. For example,
a system was set up in each resettling village so that the demands of the villagers
could be communicated well with the project implementers, although the critical
NGOs express a strong doubt about the efficacy of this system (Figure 3-2.)
The pressure of OECF, as well as the active NGO campaigns, reminded
the project implementers of the long-forgotten 1983 resolution of the villagers.
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Figure 3-2. Flow Chart of the Village Level Communications
Claim and problem appealed by the resettlers
Discussion of claims and problems and report to the team leader
Report to the Regent
Instruction from the Regent for solution of the problems
Discussion and implementation
Discussion and implementation with the resettlers
(Source: Quarterly Progress Report on Environmental Aspects, PLN, 1993)
- 55-
The resulting resettlement scheme complied with a number of points stipulated
in their resolution. For example, discussion with the villagers of Plaugadan, the
first group required to relocate due to the construction of the project, began in
1989. In accordance with the request of the villagers, the new resettlement
site,Koto Ranah, was chosen close to the original village and also close to the
Provincial Road, to which the village is connected with an access road.
Therefore, the villagers did not have to move a long way, which makes
adjustment easier and takes less time.
Equally important, there was a clear pressure on the project implementers
that this resettlement should be carried out in a "democratic" way, although
"democracy" meant different things to the different parties concerned. For
example, Figure 3-3. shows that PLN was conscious about increasing
opportunities for input of the resettlers in the process (Figure 3-3.). Also, there
was a clearly recognized principle that the villagers should not be moved by
force. I was surprised to hear from a consultant that a GOI official once
suggested that they might use military force to move people out of the way. I
would suppose that this was a personal idea of this officer and not an official
plan of GOI at that point. Such an idea was immediately rejected by the
consultant, who argued that "once the military is used, that will place an
irremovable negative label on the entire project." This story made me realize that
democratic process can be easily undermined in this particular environment. At
the very least, however, there was sufficient pressure placed from various
directions that such an idea was immediately rejected before it materialized.
Second, the PLN, the implementation agency, played a major role in
resettlement. In the past PLN was very reluctant to become involved in the
resettlement issues (Butcher, 1989). Primarily as a result of the cautious position
taken by OECF, the PLN exerted a considerable effort in monitoring details of the
- 56-
Figure 3-3. Comparison of the Procedures of Compensation
Other Projects
Decree of standard
unit price for each asset
item
plants, house
cemetery
Negotiation with
the resettlers for
the price of land
Decree of unit
.price of land
Negotiation of
aggregate
compensation
Payment (bank
account or check)
Kotapanjang
Selection of 10 informal
leaders for negotiation
Negotiation of unit price of
each asset item
Agreement for the unit
price
Negotiation with each
resettler regarding the unit
price
Decree of unit price for each
asset item
Negotiation of aggregate
compensation amount with
each resettler
Payment to bank accounts
(Source: Quarterly Progress Report on Environmental Aspects, PLN, 1993)
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land
resettlement program and spent time in making sure that the resettlement
program proceeded as scheduled. An OECF official told me that "there was a
frustration among PLN officials as to why they have to worry about the ceilings
and the floors of each of the resettlers' houses. They have this pride that they are
power company. Just because these officials are in charge of Kotapanjang, they
have to look after housing problems of the resettlers...because OECF questions
these things." The engineering bias of the power authority is clearly seen in these
comments. Nevertheless, PLN had to work hard in order to live up to the
standard required by the OECF. This helped improve the resettlement program
in comparison to the past comparable cases in Indonesia.
Third, the GOJ developed a higher standard for the resettlement package
offered to the villages affected by the Kotapanjang project. The Transmigration
pattern applied in this resettlement case is called UPP, a special Transmigration
package prepared for resettlement induced by national development projects,
which had rarely been applied in the past (Table 3-4.) The quarterly
environmental report prepared by PLN shows that Koto Ranah was originally
planned to be built with a standard public Transmigration package, but later
revised to UPP. Since public Transmigration is voluntary relocation of low
income families to an outer island, the farmers generally do not receive much
more than a house and some cleared land, as well as temporary assistance after
relocation (e.g. one year supply of rice). Under the UPP, the resettling families
receive 0.5 ha of arable land to grow food crops, a house, 2 ha of rubber
plantation and 1,000 rubber trees, as well as a supply of food for the initial year
after relocation. Equally important--and unlike the usual cases of involuntary
resettlement in Indonesia-the resettlers also received cash compensation for their
assets owned in their previous village in addition to the replacement land and
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Table 3-4 Comparison of the Service Provisions between UPP and the Public
Transmigration Pattern
UPP Pattern (for Standard Public Pattern
Kotapanjang)
1) Land(per household)
House 0.01 ha 0.25 ha
House Yard 0.49 ha 0.75 ha
Plantation 2.00 ha 1.00 ha
Total 2.50 ha 2.00 ha
2) House Wooden house Wooden house
(33m2/family) (33m2/family)
3) Land Clearance
Tree cutting/Burning 2.5 ha each 1.00 ha each
Terracing by Dept. of Agriculture by the residents
4) Road
Access Road width 7.5 m width 7.5 m
(asphalt pavement)
Reconstruction of width 8.0 m -
National Road (asphalt pavement)
Reconstruction of width 6.0 m -
Provincial Road (asphalt pavement)
5) Public infrastructure
a. Dept. of Village hall, Health Village hall, Health
Transmigration center, Mosque, center, Mosque,
Elementary School, etc. Elementary School, etc.
b. PLN Village offices, Markets,
Elementary schools, --
Local government offices
6) Water Supply One well/4 families One well/4 families
7) Electricity Provided by PLN ---
8) Assistance for moving Transportation, Meals, Transportation, Meals,
Medicine, etc. Medicine, etc.
9) One year food Rice and other essential Rice and other essential
provision food food
10) Food crops Rice, Maise, Beans, etc. Rice, Maise, Beans, etc.
(Source: Quarterly Progress Report on Environmental Aspects, PLN, March
1993)
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facilities provided in new relocation site. This represented a significant
improvement from past cases, although the appropriateness of the compensation
rate is debatable, as I discuss in the following chapter.
Fourth, additional upgrading of the conditions of the UPP package was
implemented in order to replicate the standard of infrastructure found in the
original villages. These upgradings were negotiated by the resettlers of
Plaugadang. As the same service was provided to the other villages, the
successful negotiation of the Plaugadang people had an enormous positive
externality, which was made possible by three factors. First, Koto Ranah, the
resettlement site, was close enough to the original village to enable the villagers
to observe what was happening in the construction of their future home. They
could make claims to the government regarding the conditions of the new village
based on first hand information from their own observation. Second, the
attention given to the project led to frequent visits by the GOI officials, OECF,
MoFA and NGOs. The frequent visits of outsiders provided ample opportunities
for the people of Plaugadang to make their claims. In fact, people succeeded in
improving the conditions of their village this way. For example, they asked for
installation of electricity and water pumps, as they had access to these services in
Plaugadang. At another time, they claimed that the conditions of the standard
housing model of the regular Transmigration Program were inferior to their
original housing and required wooden ceilings and concrete flooring to reduce
the heat. As a result, villages were serviced by electricity, water pumps and
wells and public facilities, such as schools, community hall and mosques in Koto
Ranah. Third, the OECF provided some additional funding to make these
service provisions financially feasible.
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Chapter IV Yet Conflicts Remain
-What hindered the resettlers'voice from being heard?--
Despite the considerable improvements in the Kotapanjang resettlement
program, the NGO opposition was not appeased. As of the end of 1993, when
the payment of the compensation to all of the 10 villages was about to be
completed, the Japanese NGO alliance was still planning to make another appeal
to the GOJ, arguing that the resettlement issue of Kotapanjang had not been
resolved and that the construction of the dam should be halted. As a matter of
fact, the project implementers were experiencing problems at the resettlement
site, and my request to visit the villages for interviews with the villagers was
turned down, because "there is a prior experience that involvement of an
outsider further complicated an issue" (Facsimile message from a consultant,
Dec. 1993). Apparently, some conflicts between the villagers and the project
implementers were taking place. Why did these conflicts persist despite the
effort expended by the project implementers? In this chapter, I explore four
issues that help to explain this persisting conflict.
4.1. Lack of concern over the process
The Japanese government's reactions to the NGO-alliance resistance
movement certainly had an impact on the way in which the resettlement
program was formulated and in producing the tangible positive results discussed
in the previous chapter. There seems to have been a consensus among the
project implementers that they needed to respect the villagers' demands.
However, as I continued interviews with various parties concerned, I began to
wonder what respecting the villagers' demand really meant to the project
implementers. Evidence suggests that OECF was primarily concerned about
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obtaining "hard evidence" to demonstrate to the project opponents that resettlers
were indeed respected, without being interested in learning about the ways in
which they were respected. Of course, a major reason for this derives from the
limitation imposed by the OECFs administrative capacity. The dispute over the
agreement for resettlement is a good example. Whether the signatures for the
agreement were obtained by voluntary will of the villagers or by force was one of
the major issues of dispute between the project implementers and the opponents.
In anti-dam campaigns in 1991, the villagers and the NGOs appealed two points
about the already signed agreements: one was that the compensation rates on
assets, which were agreed upon by some of the village seniors, were invalid; the
other was that the agreement for resettlement and the list of assets, which was
signed by each household was in fact obtained by force, rather than voluntary
will of the villagers. They claimed that they were "threatened" by the land
acquisition committee members who came to obtain the signatures by saying that
unless the villager signs the agreement at that moment, the household will
eternally lose the right to receive compensation. Opponents also claimed that
the villagers were threatened by the presence of military officers, who came with
the land acquisition committee. These people were holding guns.
It is difficult to judge from the available information whether the villagers
were indeed threatened by the land acquisition committee to sign the agreement.
However, the important point is that OECF was not interested in learning about
what actually happened in the field in the process of obtaining the signature.
When I interviewed an OECF official about these claims, he basically dismissed
them. "Probably the complaints at this point simply reflect the fact that people
were not satisfied with the aggregate amount of the compensation, while
agreeing to the unit compensation rates. Once you agree to the compensation
rate and the list of assets, you automatically get the aggregate amount of
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compensation by multiplying the two and summing up each item...It often
happens that people regret their own decision even when the decision was made
by their own will at that moment, not by external force. The discussion gets too
messy if you start doubting what actually happened in obtaining the signatures.
No one can prove in a satisfactory way what happened."
However, I believe that the agreements represent a critically important
aspect of the resettlement process for several reasons. First, the collection of a
signature from each household for the agreement to resettle and for the list of
assets started in some villages in February 1991, before the village leaders agreed
on the compensation rate. This means that at least some people signed without
knowing how much they would get in compensation for their assets. Even if
these people signed the agreement by their own free will (trusting the village
leaders), the project implementers behaved improperly, because the process was
set up in such a way that these villagers obviously could not know the amount of
compensation, an important element of the conditions of their resettlement,
when expressing agreement to the resettlement.
Second, I believe that it is probably true that the land acquisition
committee members told the villagers that they would lose the right to receive
compensation unless they signed at that moment. One of the most important
objectives of the collection of the signatures on the project implementers' agenda
was to fix the number of households eligible to receive compensation. Such an
objective reflects the Kedung Ombo experience discussed in Chapter III, in which
failure to clearly define the resettling families led to problems of subdivision of
households, and to squatting of other village residents on the reservoir, with the
expectation of receiving compensation simply by moving there. Therefore, the
land acquisition committee members were correct in saying that the only way
that the villagers become eligible for receiving compensation is by signing the
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agreement no later than the cut-off date, which in effect probably required the
villagers to sign on the spot.
I believe that establishing a cut-off date for obtaining signatures was in
and of itself, a legitimate implementation step. However, in the context of the
Kotapanjang case, it exacerbated an existing problem. If discussions with the
villagers had been carried out enough so that people fully understood their
rights and the conditions of resettlement beforehand, then confusion could have
been avoided. The act of signing legal documents is threatening by its nature
regardless of what the land acquisition committee members tell the villagers.
Signing a piece of paper should be made as "non-threatening" as possible by
making sure that people understand the substance of their entitlements well
before the act of signing takes place. Substantive explanation to the villagers
should not take place while placing the documents in front of them for their
signatures. Therefore, the key issue is not really whether or not the land
acquisition committee members "threatened" the villagers with their
explanations. Rather, it is whether the villagers were given sufficient
opportunities to understand the procedures and entitlements before the
committee members arrived. The project implementers cannot justify themselves
by claiming, by pointing to the "hard-evidence," that they obtained agreement for
each necessary component of the resettlement program and, consequently, that
they had followed a "democratic" process.
4.2. The problematic aspects of "fair compensation"
Evidence suggests that the project implementers were only concentrating
on improving the resettlement program of Kotapanjang in comparison to the past
cases in Indonesia, without seriously examining the appropriateness of the
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Table 4-1. Comparison of the Compensation Rates-2.
Province RIAU West Java Central
Java
Item Kotapanjang PT. Serikat PT.Mulya PT. Sawit Cirata Mrica
Putra mir Raya Asamam
Imdam
1990 Apr. 1990 Mar. 1990 Jun. 1989 1984 1983
12,400 ha (6,000 ha) (95,872 ha) (8,000 ha)
80.5 ha 484.39 ha
A. Buildings
(Rp./m2)
1)Permanent 74,000-192,000 - -- -- 40,000- 30,000
80,000
2)Semi- 42,000-80,000 - - - 23,000- 15,000
permanent 34,000
3)Temporary 25,000-48,000 - - -- 6,000- 2,000-7,500
20,000
B.Land
(Rp./Unit)
1)House-Yard 450-750 - 100-150 -- 480 1,050
2)Rice Field 400-600 - -- -- 720 550-1,500
3)Plantation 30-50 32.5-40 10 10-20 480 --
4)Dry-land 40 - -- -- 480 -
5)Other land 30 5-11.5 3 5 -- --
6)Cemetery 75,000 - -- -- - 15,000
C. Plant
(Rp./tree)
1)Rubber 1,250-4,200 400-800 500-1,000 300-750 1,500-7,500 --
2)Coconut 1,500-4,800 - -- -- 2,000- 250-3,000
10,000
3)Clove 1,500-4,675 - -- -- 5,000- 500-15,000
150,000
4)Coffee 500-1,760 300- -- 300-600 1,000-6,000 100-3,000
5)Rambutan 2,000-9,000 500-1,500 500-1,500 500-1,500 4,000- --
10,000
6)Durian 2,000-9,900 1,000-3,500 -- 500-6,000 5,000- -
15,000
(Source: "Answers to Questionnaire," submitted by PLN to OECF, 1991)
standard applied to the past cases. Table 4-1. shows the compensation rates that
PLN offered. According to the table, the compensation rate applied in the
Kotapanjang case was considerably better than in other recent cases in Riau
province. Comparison with cases for the early 1980s in Java is difficult due to
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variations in price levels between Java and Sumatra, particularly with respect to
land, as well as general inflation. However, from the comparison between
Kotapanjang and two cases in Java, Cirata and Mrica, the general impression is
that Kotapanjang's compensation rate is at least not drastically inferior to the
two cases in Java. This is how PLN determined and justified the compensation
rates. OECF, at the same time, regarded the compensation rates as appropriate in
comparison to historical precedents.
However, the resettlers do not determine "appropriateness" of the
compensation rates in comparison to the cases elsewhere. From their point of
view, it does not matter what compensation the resettlers in Cirata received 10
years ago. Obviously, the standard of "fairness" from the resettlers' point of view
is based on other considerations. They regard the appropriate rate as being the
replacement costs of assets. Villagers and the NGOs produced a comparison of
the prices offered by the government and the replacement costs calculated by
themselves (Table 3-1.). The point that they are trying to make is--in addition to
stressing the lowness of the rates to the general public--that the compensation
offered by the Kotapanjang project is even lower than the official assessed values.
The assessed values are usually considerably lower than the market values,
which is the replacement cost for which the villagers are asking compensation.
This situation also applies to Sumatra, where the assessed value is almost always
lower than the market value because assessment is not conducted often enough
to keep up with the market.
In fact, determination of the compensation rate is often one of the most
problematic aspects of resettlement procedures. The problem is particularly
acute with regard to land, the main economic resource for farmers. When the
resettlement program is such that resettlers have to obtain land by themselves,
compensation at the assessed value results in impoverishment of the resettlers
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because the compensation does not allow the resettlers to purchase comparable
quality and quantity of land.
The justifiability of the resettlers' demand for compensation at the
replacement cost in the Kotapanjang case is a different issue. It may be possible
to refute their demands based on the fact that the resettlers are already provided
with replacement land for free and, consequently, they do not have to purchase
their own land. Therefore, cash compensation really means the provision of
supplemental income to compensate for the expected lower income for the initial
three to four years until the rubber plants become mature enough to produce
sufficient income for the resettlers. In fact, the project implementers, including
Indonesian officials as well as OECF officials, stressed that the compensation per
household adds up to about three to five years' worth of annual income per
household. They argue that productive resources, such as 2 ha of rubber
plantation, 1,000 rubber trees and 0.5 ha of arable land to produce food crops, are
already provided to each family without any cost. The role of the cash
compensation is to provide income for the transitional period until the rubber
trees grow and become their major income source. However, in my view, the
real problem is not whether or not such logic is correct. The question is, rather,
whether such logic is appropriately communicated and understood well enough
by the resettlers. If such logic is not agreeable from the villagers' point of view,
sufficient negotiation has to take place until the both parties reach an agreement.
The compensation rate is such an important element of resettlement program
that the project implementers need to make sure that the resettlers understand
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and fully agree with the way that the compensation rates are determined19.
Unfortunately, from the available information, I believe that this did not occur.
4.3. Failure to recognize the different perceptions among the villages
It is reasonable to assume that perception of the resettlement program
varied from village to village, as well as from resettler to resettler. Although
good evidence on this point is not available, it is clear that villagers differed in
their economic status before resettlement (Table 4-2.). There was a marked
difference among villages in terms of economic well-being prior to resettlement,
particularly with regard to location (i.e., relative ease of access to market) and the
quality of land. For example, Batu Bersurat and a few other villages had paddy
fields but other villages did not. Since a major part of rice production was for
domestic use, paddy field probably did not directly affect the income levels
among 0 e villages. However, it does make a considerable difference in overall
economic well-being.
The relative economic well-being before and after the resettlement has
probably been very different among the villages due to the way that the
19NGOs as well as some researchers of this case argue that the selection of the "village leaders" to
agree to the compensation rate as well as the way that the meeting with these village leaders was
held were both inappropriate.
"(The Kampar district authorities) only invited ten persons from each village, many of
whom had not yet received the authority to negotiate compensation issues on behalf of their
tribal constituencies....(Three leaders invited from Batu Bersurat) were wrongly assumed by the
district authorities to be able to represent the entire social structure of Batu Bersurat, which
encompasses one paramount chief, three koto chiefs, and 21 clan elders.
The invitations to the Batu Bersurat elders, as they told me in July 1991, were hand-
delivered at 11 o'clock at night. They were asked to come the next morning to Bankinang, with
Rp. 150,000 "traveling costs" enclosed in each invitation envelope, although a bus fare from Batu
Bersurat to Bangkinang only costs about Rp. 1,000. In that meeting on April 12-13, 1991, they
were persuaded to agree in principle with the construction of the dam and with a total
compensation budget of Rp. 35 billion. On the second item, no consensus had been reached. Yet,
at the end of the deliberations, when the village leaders were already tired of a sleepless night
and eager to go home to prepare for the Idul Fitri celebrations which start on April 16, the district
authorities distributed computer print-outs of the compensation rates" (Aditjondro, 1991).
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compensation scheme was formulated (Table 4-3.). As discussed in Chapter III,
the major part of the compensation in the Kotapanjang's scheme was in-kind
provision of economic resources, such as land and rubber trees. These and other
private and public assets and infrastructure such as houses, community facilities
and utility services, were distributed to each household and village equally,
regardless of the assets held prior to relocation. On the other hand, for the
reasons already explained, cash compensation for the assets were paid at a quite
low rate, at least lower-than-replacement-cost. Therefore, in a relative terms, the
more assets one owned previously, the worse-off one became after the
resettlement. Exactly the opposite is true about the asset-poor families and
villages. Therefore, the resettlement program--at least to a certain extent--had an
unintended redistributive effect.
Table 4-2. Pre-Resettlement Economic Status of the Villages
Number % Rice % Plantatio % Permanent %
of Field (ha) n (ha) & Semi-
Families Permanent
Houses
Plau Gadang 592 12.1 25 1.2 183 3.5 132 17.0
Muara Mahat 447 9.1 2 0.1 331 6.4 91 11.7
Tanjung Alai 313 6.4 11 0.5 103 2.0 46 5.9
Batu Bersurat 1,257 25.7 653 32.3 1,907 37.2 145 18.7
Pongkai 459 9.3 437 21.6 647 12.6 38 4.9
Koto Tuo 599 12.2 456 22.5 616 12.0 143 18.4
Muara Takus 244 4.9 5 0.2 331 6.4 52 6.7
Gunung 241 4.9 350 17.3 25 0.4 20 2.5
Bungsu
Tanjung Balit 421 8.6 51 2.5 860 16.7 80 10.3
Tanjung Pauh 313 6.4 28 1.3 122 2.3 26 3.3
Total 1 4,8861 100.01 2,0181 100.01 5,125 100.01 773 OO.O
(Source: Environmental Impact Analysis. Andalas University, 1984)
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Table 4-3. Composition of the Resettlement Budget
(in thousand Rp.)
Allocation Proposed Total
1992/93 1993/94 Budget
for 92/93-
93/94
Land clearing 3,754,621 7,801,257 11,555,878
In-kind Roads & 12,730,935 4,535,740 17,266,675
Bridges
Housing and 4,671,319 2,609,140 7,280,459
water supply I I
Supervision 1,029,341 -- 1,029,341
Total In-kind 22,186,216 14,946137] 37,132,353 43.2%
Cash 46,800,000 56.8%
(Source: BAPPENAS, 1993)
This difference in relative economic well-being before and after
resettlement seems to explain some of the reactions in different villages. For
example, the village of Gunung Bungsu was supposed to be quite excited about
the resettlement program. According to a consultant, Gunung Bungsu pressured
the project implementers to push the relocation schedule forward to early 1993,
although their resettlement was scheduled later, in accordance with the
construction schedule of the dam. On the other hand, villagers of Batu Bersurat
were very concerned about their future. Batu Bersurat and Koto Tuo played the
central role in the resistance movement. Villagers in Koto Tuo initiated the
collections of signatures to petition for the invalidation of the compensation
rates. The people of Batu Bersurat consisted in large part of the villagers who
went to Jakarta for a campaign, and of the person who flew to Japan was also
from Batu Bersurat. I learned from Prof. Murai, who works with the Japanese
NGO alliance, that the villagers of Batu Bersurat knew very well about the
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compensation conditions of Koto Ranah and firmly refused to allow similar
conditions to be applied to their future village. For example, leaders of Batu
Bersurat hated the housing design in Koto Ranah, which is basically the same as
the houses provided in public Transmigration, although some internal
improvements were made. According to Prof. Murai, leaders of Batu Bersurat
insisted that they requested provision of Permunas (Pembangunan Permahan
Nasional, the National Housing Corporation) housing20 in the 1983 resolution
and that the government should fulfill their original request. Batu Bersurat was
the last village to receive compensation in late 1993, and this was probably where
the project implementers had the hardest time completing the payment of
compensation and resettlement.
From the discussion above, it appears reasonable to conclude that there
had been varying degrees of acceptance and of resentment over the
compensation scheme among the villages, even when evaluated exclusively from
the economic point of view. Although more equitable distribution of income
itself is probably not a negative consequence of the resettlement program, it does
not seem to make sense to seek redistribution within the resettling villages by
having the richer members of the community to support the compensation of the
poorer members21. If the resettlement program intended to have redistributive
effect, the program needs to include a larger geographical area in the picture.
This means that people who directly benefit from the dam project (i.e. the urban
industrial sectors, electrified households, etc.) should be part of the
20Walk-up flats built by the National Housing Corporation, mainly prepared for middle-income
population. The National Housing Corporation operates to build housing and neighborhood
infrastructure, including land acquisition and land development, sites and service and financing.
21The Environmental Impact Assessment Report, prepared by the Andalas University comments
that the application of the Transmigration scheme is desirable in order to correct the skewed
income distributions among the resettling villages (Andalas University, 1984).
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redistributive program to support the well-being of the members of the resettling
villages.
4.4. Lack of commitment to resettlers' participation
Most importantly, the project implementers lacked a true commitment to
encouraging the participation of the resettlers in program design and
implementation. There are four important issues which highlight this lack of
commitment. The first is the timetable determined to formulate and implement
the resettlement program. As already discussed, Kotapanjang' s feasibility study
was conducted by JICA nearly a decade prior to the approval of the loan by the
OECF for the project, when international concern for resettlers' rights was not
clearly expressed. The OECF recognized that no satisfactory plan for resettlement
existed at the time of appraisal, but both the GOJ and the OECF were optimistic
that these problems would be resolved within the pre-set schedule of the project.
I see this as an unjustifiably mechanical way of understanding of the problem of
resettlement, if the OECF was genuinely interested in providing sufficient
opportunities for the resettlers to express their free decisions and negotiating
with them.
In fact, according to information provided by a consultant, the
construction schedule of the resettlement site of Koto Ranah, which began in
1989, was already problematic. Discussions with the resettlers started in 1989,
but the site preparation of Koto Ranah also began in the same year. This means
that preparation for resettlement actually had started even before agreement
from each household was obtained, which took place in 1991. The consultant
informed me that such schedule was implemented because there was some
remaining budget of the Department of Transmigration for that financial year
and this budget was used for land preparation in Koto Ranah.
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Given such a hasty time table, OECF's pressure to "respect the villagers"
had an ambivalent effect. On the one hand, it had a certain positive influence in
improving the conditions of the new resettlement sites, as discussed in Chapter
III. On the other hand, however, the pressure to "obtain written agreements"
within the pre-determined time table may have given the wrong signal to the
field level implementers of the resettlement program, such as the land acquisition
committee members encouraging them to pressure the villagers to cooperate. If
OECF truly valued the villagers' independent decisions, it should have allowed
enough time to consult the villagers before the construction schedule was set.
The second issue is closely related to the first: the issue of defining
resettlement as an "environmental problem." By defining resettlement as part of
the "environmental problem," the project implementers seem to have failed to
recognize the difference of two distinct sets of problems: the resettlement of
22,000 people and the relocation of some 30 elephants. I do not discount the
importance of protecting the endangered species; however, I believe that there is
a qualitative difference between issues concerning human-beings and those
concerning natural environments. The term "environment" gives a misleading
impression that people are simply part of the scenery and that the producers can
manipulate them in any way they want. In this sense, I question the legitimacy
of the donor agencies' common practice, which is not limited to the case of the
Kotapanjang, of defining social and human elements of development projects as
''social environmental issues."
Third, the process lacked an effective commitment to information
dissemination. The project implementers were not willing to share information
about the compensation with the resettlers. For example, the compensation rate
for West Sumatra and Riau was different for reasons that were not well-
explained. In fact, the OECF official in charge of the project was not aware of this
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fact. In any event, this difference was not perceived as an important factor by the
project implementers. According to information that I obtained from an
Indonesian official, the difference in the compensation rate was not significant
(Table 4-4.). Because correct information was not shared with the resettlers, there
was a big rumor among the villagers of Riau and the NGOs that people in West
Sumatra were receiving ten times as much for their lost assets. In fact, villagers
in West Sumatra did not take part in the resistance movements. The rumors
were widespread and aggravated the villagers' distrust of the GOJ and GOI.
Such a problem took place due to the lack of an information sharing effort.
Table 4-4. Comparison of Average Amount of Compensation
Amount of Cash
Village Compensation
(Rp. million/household)
Plau Gadang 11.8
Muara Mahat 6.3
Tanjung Alai 8.6
Riau Batu Bersurat 9.1
Pongkai 9.8
Koto Tuo 9.7
Muara Takus 7.4
Gunung Bungsu 6.2
West Sumatra Tanjung Balit 12.4
_Tanjung Pauh 13.1
(Source: "Answer of Questionnaire" submitted by PLN to OECF, 1993)
Fourth, lack of recognition of the resettlement program as a "development
project" of the resettlers. The consensus of "respecting the resettlers' demand"
among the project implementers helped strengthen the bargaining position of the
resettlers. However, the project implementers failed to view the resettlement
program as a "development" program, instead of viewing at it as a "welfare"
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program. Consequently, they only viewed resettlers as recipients of welfare;
they could not recognize the resettlers as active participants in the formulation as
well as the implementation of the project.
The complaints on the housing style illustrated the problem. Many
resettlers were unhappy about the ready-made housing style of the
Transmigration Program. In the 1983 resolution, they requested Permunas
housing, but GOI judged that Permunas housing was too expensive and built
Transmigration houses instead. For some reason, GOI did not consider any other
option that might have been better received by the villagers and less expensive
than Permunas housing. My own impression of the houses in the new
settlements was also not very favorable; the houses were tasteless box styles in
comparison to the houses in the villages prior to resettlement in the original
villages. People had houses of unique designs, many of which had roofs of
Minankabau style22. I heard from a number of NGO staff that the villagers felt
insulted to be moving into the same houses as public transmigrants. People in
Koto Ranah were expanding the houses by themselves with wood and tin plates
from the old houses that they had brought with them from Plaugadang. One
woman in Koto Ranah told me that she was particularly unhappy about the
small kitchen that was provided with the Transmigration house, and that she and
her husband constructed an annex by themselves to use as kitchen. Eventually,
people modified the program through self-help housing construction, despite the
project's imposition of the uniform houses. They also succeeded in persuading
the project officials to improve the internal structure of the houses. Nevertheless,
many villagers remained dissatisfied with the whole idea of Transmigration
houses.
22Unique curved line roof design of the Minankabau tribe that is based on the image of the head
of a cow.
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In light of this situation, it is important to ask why the GOI had to stick
with a housing design that only made people unhappy. My own sense is that the
GOI was obsessed with the idea that they had to provide houses for the
beneficiaries. Out of their existing housing design portfolio, GOI could not come
up with any idea that met cost limits and satisfied the people. However, the GOI
did not go back to the villagers in order to ask their input in the housing designs.
Ultimately, the GOI and the OECF, as well did not truly understand the concept
of resettlers' participation. Both the GOI and OECF could not view the
resettlement program as a "development" program, in which they needed an
active participation of the resettlers.
In sum, it is not clear whether the NGOs' continuing opposition to the
project that I observed in late 1993 - early 1994 represents feeling of the majority
of the villagers. However, this continuing resistance does highlight the existence
of negative perceptions in at least some of the villages, for good reasons. These
persisting negative perceptions are not something that the project implementers
should easily dismiss by regarding them as the complaints of "greedy
minorities." I believe that the project implementers can benefit by learning
lessons from the negative aspects of the Kotapanjang case. In the next and final
chapter, I summarize my evaluation of the Kotapanjang case and discuss some
possible measures for future improvement of resettlement programs.
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Chapter V. Conclusion and Recommendation for the Japanese Aid Agencies
I this chapter, I will first summarize the evaluation of the involuntary
resettlement of the 10 villages under the Kotapanjang hydroelectric power
generation project and, second, present recommendations for the Japanese aid
agencies based on this case study.
5.1. Summary of the evaluation of the resettlement process
Resettlement experts identify several stages in the process of involuntary
resettlement. People are very risk averse for at least about two years after
relocation ("The Transition Stage"), but tend to show more initiative and take
more risks when their standard of living recovers to the level enjoyed prior to
relocation ("The Stage of Potential Development") (Scudder and Colson, 1982).
However, many resettlement programs never pass the transition stage and reach
the stage of potential development. The literature suggests that the "long-term
success" of resettlement is not known until "management of local production
systems and the running of the local community are handed over to a second
generation that identifies with the community," which is the "Handing
Over/Incorporation Stage," the final stage of the resettlement process (Scudder
and Colson, 1982). Therefore, it is obviously much too early to attempt to
determine the overall "success" of the Kotapanjang case. Nevertheless, I believe
it is helpful to consider the preliminary evaluation of this case by summarizing
the analysis of the project presented in Chapters III and IV. As is clear from the
summary below, I observed mixed outcomes in the resettlement program under
the Kotapanjang project.
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A. The project was successful in:
1) Giving legitimacy to the resettlers' demands, in marked contrast to previous
resettlement efforts
The resettlement scheme complied with a number of demands stipulated in the
1983 resolution of the villagers of the villages to be displaced by the project. This
resulted from the popular opposition of the NGOs both in Japan and in
Indonesia that called for unusual direct involvement of the OECF (the Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund), the Japanese aid agency, in the resettlement case.
2) Motivating the PLN (the National Electric Power Authority) officers to play
a major role in the resettlement program;
PLN, the implementation agency of the project, used to'be reluctant to become
involved in resettlement issues in the past, but under the pressure imposed by
the OECF, the PLN officers worked to improve the quality of the resettlement
program in the Kotapanjang case.
3) Improving the standard of the resettlement package in comparison to the past
cases in Indonesia;
The project partly followed the common practice of development-project-
induced resettlement in Indonesia, by providing the resettlers with services of
the National Transmigration Program. However, the Transmigration service
package applied to the resettling villages was UPP (Project Implementation
Unit), a special Transmigration pattern, superior to the originally proposed
public Transmigration package.
4) Incorporating the resettlers' evolving demands in some of the important
elements of the resettlement program, and in the upgradings of the UPP
package.
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The selection of the resettlement sites and the improvement in infrastructure
under the program were the result of negotiations with the resettlers of
Plaugadang, the first village relocated under the project.
B. The project suffered from:
1) Lack of concern over the process by the project implementers;
OECF only focused on the "hard evidence" of a "democratic" process allegedly
followed (e.g., signatures of the villagers on agreements for resettlement) to
justify the legitimacy of the process to its opponents, and did not pay attention to
the actual process of the resettlement.
2) Lack of recognition of different perceptions of the standard of 'fairness" of the
compensation rates between the Indonesian government and the resettlers;
Both the Indonesian and the Japanese government were concerned about
improving the compensation rate in a relative terms in comparison to the
historical precedents, but the resettlers were interested in obtaining replacement
costs for their assets.
3) Failure to recognize different perceptions among the villages;
The project unintendedly had a redistributive effect among the resettling villages
and the relative economic well-being before and after the resettlement differed
among the 10 villages depending on the assets held previously.
4) Lack of commitment to resettlers'participation.
The project implementers were overly optimistic about the problem of
resettlement and assumed that the issues would be resolved within the pre-set
schedule, without either allowing enough time to earn the trust of the resettlers
through consultations, or expending an adequate effort toward information
dissemination. Moreover, by defining the resettlement as a part of an
"environmental problem," the project failed to recognize the qualitative
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difference between the resettlement issue and other natural environmental
impacts of the project. Most importantly, because the project implementers
viewed resettlement as a "welfare project" rather than as a "development project,"
they failed to encourage full participation of the resettlers in either planning or
implementation of the program.
5.2. Recommendations for the Japanese Aid Agencies
Based on the results of my project analysis, as well as an examination of
international donors' resettlement policies, I would like to recommend the
following to the Japanese aid agencies for the purpose of improving their
performance in future resettlement projects:
1) Clearly recognize the donor's responsibility in involuntary resettlement;
The self-imposed limitation of Japanese aid agencies designed to maintain
a "non-intervention" principle seems to be harmful in resettlement project
implementation. In the case of Kotapanjang, the OECF clearly redefined its role
in the resettlement, assuming the responsibilities of monitoring and placing
external pressure on the PLN to improve the resettlement program. This was a
large step forward for the Japanese government, given its past history. However,
the OECF restricted its role to monitoring of the resettlement program, relying
heavily on the information provided by the Indonesian government.
Consequently, OECF simply examined and approved the reported "results" of
each step of the resettlement and failed to directly observe the critical aspects of
the process. In addition to Japan's political position, the OECF's lack of capacity
in effect prevented it from playing any greater part in the resettlement program.
The Japanese government and the aid agencies need to reexamine their policies
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as well as their institutional capacity in order to permit Japanese agencies to
actively ensure an appropriate resettlement process.
2) Place more emphasis on the preparation of projects;
More resources should be allocated to early preparation of projects rather
than the construction of the project per se. JICA (the Japan International
Cooperation Agency), in particular, should put more emphasis on the
examination of project alternatives and/or alternative project designs that avoid
resettlement or minimize the size and impact of resettlement.
I believe that one of the major reasons for the failure to consider project
alternatives that minimize resettlement is the failure to accurately calculate the
costs of resettlement. Conventional cost-benefit studies only include cash
compensation and temporary provision of necessities immediately after
relocation and, at most, the cost of land preparation and provision of housing
and basic infrastructure. However, the real cost of resettlement would include
the much longer-term costs of resettlement as a "development project," as
opposed to the conventional definition of resettlement as a short-term "welfare
project." This means that resettlement program should ensure, at the very least,
resettlers' recovery of the standard of living they had prior to resettlement. In
fact, because the benefit of the development project (in the Kotapanjang case,
electric power generation by the construction of a dam), which is supposed to
reach a large percent of population, is not possible without the resettlement
(given existing project design), the resettlers are more than entitled to receive
their share of benefits from the development project. Therefore, the cost of
resettlement should include the cost of development of the resettling
communities to improve their standard of living above their pre-resettlement
standard. If this were done, the importance of minimizing the number of people
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to be resettled would be taken much more seriously in order to ensure the
economic justification of the development projects.
The more difficult cases would probably involve the projects that have
already advanced to later stages of the project cycle without appropriate
consideration of the resettlement issue, like the case of Kotapanjang.
Theoretically, such a project should go back to the feasibility stage to re-do the
feasibility study, but in reality, this seems to be an unlikely option for both the
Japanese government and the recipient countries. Because it often takes a long
time for the projects to progress from JICA feasibility studies to the approval
stage by OECF, OECF will continue to encounter projects that lack appropriate
examination of the resettlement issue during the feasibility study stage.
Therefore, more emphasis on preparation at the OECF level is very important. It
often happens that as the construction start date of the project approaches and
the amount of money flowing into the project grows, the harder it becomes to
engage in such time consuming-efforts as consultation with and dissemination of
information for the resettlers. This is exactly what happened in the Kotapanjang
case. The resettlement time table was determined without appropriate
consultation and information dissemination for the resettling villages. As a
result, the project failed to earn the resettlers' support and the achievements
made in other areas were considerably diminished.
3) Allocate special staff on resettlement and social policies to each operational
division;
The Operational Directives 4.30 of the World Bank and the OECD
resettlement policy guidelines present all of the important policy principles of
international donors regarding resettlement. The OECF is in the process of
adopting its own guidelines on resettlement, which are supposed to be used as a
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check-list for appraisal of projects. The July 1993 draft seems to require quite
elaborate prior social analysis, but it is not clear how and when such studies are
to be conducted and what OECF should do if appropriate preparation had not
been made prior to appraisal (OECF (draft), 1993). The more critical issue seems
to be the actual application and implementation of the principles, rather than the
issues of what the principles should be. In this regard, environmental NGOs
express strong doubt about and dissatisfaction with the efficacy of the
"mandatory" policies stipulated in the Directives at the World Bank. I lack
sufficient knowledge to evaluate the implementation of the resettlement policies
at the World Bank. However, my sense is that implementation strategy at JICA
and OECF should probably differ from that of the World Bank for the reasons
given below.
The major reason is that dissemination of a new policy from a "specialized
department" (comparable to the Environmental Department at the World Bank)
does not seem to work very well in Japan--or, at least, dissemination takes too
long. For example, in the case of initiative to promote the concept of Women in
Development at OECF, an official of the Department of Economic Studies, rather
than officials of operational departments, was appointed as the focal point of the
initiative. While I admired her individual role as a symbol of the initiative, I
could see neither a role for her beyond consciousness-raising in the agency nor a
viable strategy for operationally integrating the initiative into the operational
departments. Particularly given the fact that many of the OECF officials
(including this Women in Development official) are temporarily transferred from
various governmental ministries to the OECF, introduction of new initiatives
should directly start in the operational departments, involving as many
permanent officials as possible.
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In addition, unless one closely monitors the progress of the project, one
cannot appropriately tackle the issues at each stage. Experts' advice in
"emergency" situations does not really help; what is needed is continuous
observation and interaction with the resettlers. Therefore, rather than assigning
experts to one specialized department, I would recommend that the agencies
appoint specialized staff or long-term consultants on resettlement and social
issues in all operational departments which directly handle projects. These staff
or long-term consultants may cover several operational departments if staff
allocation for each single department is difficult. The important point is that
these staff are specialized by task rather than geographical regions and are not
responsible for the administration of the entire project.
4) Clearly recognize the importance of the resettlers'participation;
In the case of Kotapanjang, there was a consensus among the project
implementers that the resettlers' demands should be respected. However, the
recognition of the project implementers did not advance to the next step of
ensuring the resettlers' meaningful participation in the resettlement project.
There is a marked difference between simply "respecting" the resettlers' demands
with a recognition of the resettlers as passive beneficiaries and policies to ensure
the resettlers' participation by looking at them as active participants in
development projects. As elaborated in Chapter IV, the Kotapanjang project
clearly recognized the resettlers as counterparts in negotiation, which was a
significant improvement over the past resettlement cases; yet there was a failure
to recognize their capacity to participate in the formulation and implementation
of the resettlement program. The resettlers eventually participated in such
activities as self-help housing, despite the project's imposition of the uniform
houses. However, by more clearly recognizing the resettlers' capacity--as well as
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their right-to create their own future in accordance with their own preferences,
the Kotapanjang resettlement program could have been formulated to better
meet their needs and tastes without necessarily violating budgetary constraints.
5) Learn lessons from the mistakes made in Japan .
The application of Japan's development experience to the developing
countries has been a popular concept not only among Japanese development
practitioners, but also in some of the international agencies. In terms of
resettlement, I believe it is critically important that the Japanese aid agencies
learn lessons from the mistakes of resettlement policies in Japan in the past (and
perhaps in the present as well), as I discussed in Chapter II, Section 2.3. The
historical problems of the government of Japan's centralized project development
style, namely, a lack of consultation with project-affected families and the single-
minded understanding of the concept of compensation as an amount of cash still
seems to persist. In the course of rapid industrialization, the Japanese
government expected that resettlers would individually self-migrate to the urban
industrial sector and did not pay attention to such negative impacts as the
destruction of community, which, if replicated today in. developing countries,
may lead to more serious problems than in the case of Japan. Application of the
"Japanese way of doing things" is nQt a good idea as far as the resettlement
program is concerned. Likewise, justifications of the process based on the
experience of Japan should never be used. The aid agencies have to learn new
and better ways of ensuring resettlers' participation in the formulation and
implementation of resettlement projects in developing countries. This may be a
good example of how Japan could learn lessons from the experience of
developing countries for application to domestic policy.
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Appendix I.
Letter of Appeal (December 19,1983)
We, the people of Kecamatan XIII Koto Kampar consisting of traditional
leaders, Ninik Mmak, and Religious leaders held a meeting at Batus Bersurat on
Monday, 19, December 1983. Unanimously, we would like to state the following:
First, we fully support the government's program with regard to the Koto
Panjang Hydroelectric Project at Kecamatan XIII Koto Kampar, Kabupaten
Kampar, Riau.
Second, we appeal the following to the government:
1. We, the people of Kecamatan XIII Koto Kampar appeal to the government
that the new settlement be located in the area surrounding the road which will be
built along the lake/reservoir. Thus would the status of the village and
Kecamatan not be altered.
2. Prior to resettlement from the old locale to the new one, the site should be
selected three years ahead of time, during which the houses should be
constructed.
3. Before the resettlement, each family should be given 2 ha of mature palm
oil, rubber plantation.
4. Each house to be constructed in the resettlement area should be the same
type as specified within PERUMUNAS with a housing land area of 1/2 ha and
prepared cultivation land of 2 ha.
5. The government should provide basic life supplies for three years.
6. That the entire property of the community be evaluated and priced for
compensation. The mature crop land areas should be counted-at the minimum--
for the sum total of 5 years of crop yields.
7. The government should construct facilities such as mosques/religious
buildings, markets, as well as facilities to provide both a reliable electricity and a
clean water supply.
8. The compensation money should be given to the people before moving to
their new settlement.
9. Compensation money should be given directly to each family, without the
use of an intermediary, to prevent unwanted incidents.
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10. Before the compensation money is given, the government is asked to
establish a branch bank, BRT, at the capital of Kecamatan XIII Koto Kampar.
11. The government shoulders the entire expense of resettlement of each
family.
12. a. That plantation lands be provided for each resettled village.
b. That extra land allotment for population growth be provided.
c. That grazing areas for cattle be provided.
13. That historical graves be moved to the new settlement. Among those
buried there include, among other locations:
-Syekh H. Abdul Ghani at Batus Bersurat;
-Syekh H. Jaafar at Pulau Gadang;
-Shykh H. Abdurrahman at Tanjung Alai.
14. That the government establish a high school and a vocational school in the
new settlement.
15. That the administration expenses of the compensation process (including
tax) be the responsibility of the government and not the people.
16. In the physical construction of the project the executing agency prioritizes
the hiring of local labor with their existing skills, experience and educational
background.
17. That government grants ownership or unflooded new land (once the
water level resides) to the people.
Thus is this statement made on the consensus of the people for the
consideration of the government.
On behalf of the Community
-92-
Appendix II.
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In Indonesia
Mr. Indro
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Mr. Effendi Tedjakusuma
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Dr. Manuwoto,
Mr. Hisanori Morita
Mr. Toshio Kanokogi
Mr. Y. Yoshida
Mr. Koji Fujimoto
Mr. Takaaki Hattori
Dr. Indrawan Soelaeman
Mr. Peter van Tuijl
Secretary, SKEPHI
Attorney, ELSAM
Attorney, LBH
Chairman, WALHI, Riau
Bureau for Transmigration, BAPPENAS
Bureau for Regional Development Aid I,
National Development Planning Agency(BAPPENAS)
Head of Bereau of Environment,
National Development Planning Agency(BAPPENAS)
Project Manager, Tokyo Electric Power Services Co.,
Ltd.Kotapanjang Office
Deputy Manager, Tokyo Electric Power Services Co.,
Ltd. Hydro-Power Engineering Department
Resident Engineer, Tokyo Electric Power Services Co.,
Ltd.
Chief Representative, The Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund of Japan, Jakarta Office
Representative, The Overseas Economic Cooperation
Fund of Japan, Jakarta Office
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Secretary, International NGO Forum on Indonesian
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In Japan
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Prof. Kazuo Sumi,
Ms.
Mr.
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Prof. Yoshinori Murai
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Mr. Naruhiro Takesada
Mr. Kenji Kimura
Officer, Suigenchi-Taisaku, Bureau of Rivers
Development, Ministry of Construction
Staff Reporter, Kyodo News Service
International Development Center, Japan
Environmental Specialist, Technical Appraisal
Coordination and Planning Division, Technical
Appraisal Department, The Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund (OECF)
Project Officer, Technical Appraisal Coordination and
Planning Division, Technical Appraisal Department
The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund(OECF)
Secretary General, The Founddation for Human
Rights in Asia, Japan
Secretary, Japan NGO Network on Indonesia
Professor, International Environmental Law,
Yokohama City University
The Friends of the Earth, Japan
Graduate Student, Satiya Wachana Christian
University
Professor, Center for Asian Studies, Sophia
University
Graduate Student, Brown University
(Former Project Officer, 2nd Division, Loan
Department I, The Overseas Economic Development
Fund)
Graduate Student, Harvard University
(Former Project Officer, Technical Appraisal
Department, The Overseas Economic Cooperation
Fund)
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